Excess payoff dynamics, potential dynamics, and stable games
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Bill Sandholm, 2003. "Excess Payoff Dynamics, Potential Dynamics, and Stable Games," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000042, UCLA Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Samuelson, L., 1989.
"Evolutionnary Stability In Asymmetric Games,"
Papers
11-8-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Papers 9132, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
- Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1990. "Evolutionary Stability In Symmetric Games," Working papers 90-24, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993.
"Learning Mixed Equilibria,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
- Fudenberg, D. & Kreps, D.M., 1992. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Working papers 92-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps, 2010. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 415, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998.
"Learning in games,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
- Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jorgen W., 1996.
"Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 558-573, November.
- Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1995. "Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies," Working Paper Series 433, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- J. Hofbauer & J. Weibull, 2010. "Evolutionary Selection against dominated strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 444, David K. Levine.
- Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jîrgen W., 1995. "Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 9506, CEPREMAP.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 2013.
"A General Class Of Adaptive Strategies,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Simple Adaptive Strategies From Regret-Matching to Uncoupled Dynamics, chapter 3, pages 47-76,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 2001. "A General Class of Adaptive Strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 26-54, May.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1999. "A General Class of Adaptive Strategies," Game Theory and Information 9904001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Mar 2000.
- Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1999. "A general class of adaptative strategies," Economics Working Papers 373, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1995.
"Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(6), pages 1371-1399, November.
- Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1993. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal Form Games," Working Paper Series 383, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- K. Ritzberger & J. Weibull, 2010. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 452, David K. Levine.
- William H. Sandholm, 2002.
"Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(3), pages 667-689.
- Sandholm,W.H., 1999. "Evolutionary implementation and congestion pricing," Working papers 38, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
- Gaunersdorfer Andrea & Hofbauer Josef, 1995.
"Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons, and the Replicator Equation,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 279-303, November.
- A. Gaunersdorfer & J. Hofbauer, 2010. "Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons and the Replicator Equation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 438, David K. Levine.
- Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm, 2002. "On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2265-2294, November.
- Michel BenaÔm & J–rgen W. Weibull, 2003.
"Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 873-903, May.
- Benaim, Michel & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2000. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Working Paper Series 534, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 30 Oct 2001.
- Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, 1999. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(2), pages 363-393.
- Sandholm, William H., 2001.
"Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 81-108, March.
- Sandholm,W.H., 1999. "Potential games with continuous player sets," Working papers 23, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, "undated". "Evolutionary Drift And Equilibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 049, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
- Ely,J.C. & Sandholm,W.H., 2000.
"Evolution with diverse preferences,"
Working papers
5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Jeffery C. Ely & William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Evolution with Diverse Preferences," Discussion Papers 1317, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998.
"The Theory of Learning in Games,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "The Theory of Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 624, David K. Levine.
- Swinkels Jeroen M., 1993.
"Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 455-484, July.
- Jeroen M. Swinkels, 1991. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Discussion Papers 1001, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- J. Swinkels, 2010. "Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 456, David K. Levine.
- Hofbauer, Josef & Sandholm, William H., 2007.
"Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 47-69, January.
- Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H., 2003. "Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Working papers 20, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Hopkins, Ed, 1999.
"A Note on Best Response Dynamics,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 138-150, October.
- Ed Hopkins, 1997. "A Note on Best Response Dynamics," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 3, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Gilboa, Itzhak & Matsui, Akihiko, 1991.
"Social Stability and Equilibrium,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 859-867, May.
- Itzhak Gilboa & Akihiko Matsui, 1991. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Post-Print hal-00753235, HAL.
- I. Gilboa & A. Matsui, 2010. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 534, David K. Levine.
- Sandholm, William H., 2003. "Evolution and equilibrium under inexact information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 343-378, August.
- Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, "undated". "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 011, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
- Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1995.
"Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection,"
Working papers
9529, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1997. "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," Working papers 9729r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-666, May.
- Vickrey, William S, 1969. "Congestion Theory and Transport Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 251-260, May.
- Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
- Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
- Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Sandholm,W.H., 2002. "Potential dynamics and stable games," Working papers 21, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Sandholm, William H., 2005. "Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 124(2), pages 149-170, October.
- Sandholm, William H., 2015. "Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
- William H. Sandholm, 1997. "An Evolutionary Approach to Congestion," Discussion Papers 1198, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Antonio Cabrales & Giovanni Ponti, 2000. "Implementation, Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies and Evolutionary Dynamics," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 3(2), pages 247-282, April.
- Berger, Ulrich & Hofbauer, Josef, 2006.
"Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 1-6, July.
- Ulrich Berger & Josef Hofbauer, 2004. "Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics," Game Theory and Information 0409002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Sep 2004.
- Jonathan Newton, 2018. "Evolutionary Game Theory: A Renaissance," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(2), pages 1-67, May.
- Sandholm, William H., 2001.
"Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 81-108, March.
- Sandholm,W.H., 1999. "Potential games with continuous player sets," Working papers 23, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H., 2001.
"Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs,"
Working papers
5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Evolution and Learning in Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs," Vienna Economics Papers 0205, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Weibull, Jörgen W., 1997. "What have we learned from Evolutionary Game Theory so far?," Working Paper Series 487, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 26 Oct 1998.
- Reinoud Joosten, 2009. "Paul Samuelson's critique and equilibrium concepts in evolutionary game theory," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2009-16, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
- Waters, George A., 2009. "Chaos in the cobweb model with a new learning dynamic," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1201-1216, June.
- Hofbauer, Josef & Sandholm, William H., 2009. "Stable games and their dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1665-1693.4, July.
- Mertikopoulos, Panayotis & Sandholm, William H., 2018. "Riemannian game dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 315-364.
- Hofbauer, Josef & Sandholm, William H., 2007.
"Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 47-69, January.
- Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H., 2003. "Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Working papers 20, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- repec:cdl:ucsbec:6-98 is not listed on IDEAS
- Lahkar, Ratul & Sandholm, William H., 2008. "The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 565-590, November.
- Viossat, Yannick, 2008.
"Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 27-43, July.
- Viossat, Yannick, 2006. "Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 629, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 21 Jun 2006.
- Yannick Viossat, 2008. "Evolutionary Dynamics May Eliminate All Strategies Used in Correlated Equilibria," Post-Print hal-00360756, HAL.
- Hofbauer, Josef & Hopkins, Ed, 2005.
"Learning in perturbed asymmetric games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 133-152, July.
- Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2000. "Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 53, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H., 2001.
"Evolution and learning in games with randomly disturbed payoffs,"
Working papers
5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm, 2001. "Evolution and Learning in Games with Randomly Disturbed Payoffs," Vienna Economics Papers vie0205, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
- Sandholm, William H., 2007.
"Evolution in Bayesian games II: Stability of purified equilibria,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 641-667, September.
- Sandholm,W.H., 2003. "Evolution in Bayesian games II : stability of purified equilibria," Working papers 21, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:att:wimass:20035. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ailsenne Sumwalt (email available below). General contact details of provider: .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.