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Excess payoff dynamics, potential dynamics, and stable games

  • Sandholm,W.H.

    (University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute)

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    No abstract is available for this item.

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    Paper provided by Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems in its series Working papers with number 5.

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    Date of creation: 2003
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:att:wimass:20035
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    1. Ritzberger, Klaus & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1993. "Evolutionary Selection in Normal Form Games," Working Paper Series 383, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    2. I. Gilboa & A. Matsui, 2010. "Social Stability and Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 534, David K. Levine.
    3. Samuelson, L., 1989. "Evolutionnary Stability In Asymmetric Games," Papers 11-8-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    4. Matsui, Akihiko, 1992. "Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 343-362, August.
    5. Hopkins, Ed, 1999. "A Note on Best Response Dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 138-150, October.
    6. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
    7. Sergiu Hart & Andreu Mas-Colell, 1999. "A general class of adaptative strategies," Economics Working Papers 373, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    8. Hofbauer, Josef & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1995. "Evolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies," Working Paper Series 433, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    9. Hofbauer,J. & Sandholm,W.H., 2003. "Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs," Working papers 20, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    10. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
    11. Nachbar, J H, 1990. ""Evolutionary" Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 19(1), pages 59-89.
    12. Josef Hofbauer & William H. Sandholm, 2002. "On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2265-2294, November.
    13. William H. Sandholm, 2002. "Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 667-689.
    14. Benaim, Michel & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2000. "Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games," Working Paper Series 534, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 30 Oct 2001.
    15. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August.
    16. Gaunersdorfer Andrea & Hofbauer Josef, 1995. "Fictitious Play, Shapley Polygons, and the Replicator Equation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 279-303, November.
    17. Friedman, Daniel, 1991. "Evolutionary Games in Economics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 637-66, May.
    18. Sandholm, William H., 2001. "Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 81-108, March.
    19. Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
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