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Stable games and their dynamics

  • Hofbauer, Josef
  • Sandholm, William H.

We study a class of population games called stable games. These games are characterized by self-defeating externalities: when agents revise their strategies, the improvements in the payoffs of strategies to which revising agents are switching are always exceeded by the improvements in the payoffs of strategies which revising agents are abandoning. We prove that the set of Nash equilibria of a stable game is globally asymptotically stable under a wide range of evolutionary dynamics. Convergence results for stable games are not as general as those for potential games: in addition to monotonicity of the dynamics, integrability of the agents' revision protocols plays a key role.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 144 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (July)
Pages: 1665-1693.e4

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:4:p:1665-1693.e4
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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