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Large population potential games

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  • Sandholm, William H.

Abstract

We offer a parsimonious definition of large population potential games, provide some alternate characterizations, and demonstrate the advantages of the new definition over the existing definition, but also show the equivalence of the two definitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandholm, William H., 2009. "Large population potential games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1710-1725, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:4:p:1710-1725
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sandholm, William H., 2001. "Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 81-108, March.
    2. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Guanghui Yang & Chanchan Li & Jinxiu Pi & Chun Wang & Wenjun Wu & Hui Yang, 2021. "Characterizations of Pareto-Nash Equilibria for Multiobjective Potential Population Games," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-13, January.
    2. Christian Ewerhart, 2020. "Ordinal potentials in smooth games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(4), pages 1069-1100, November.
    3. Cheung, Man-Wah, 2014. "Pairwise comparison dynamics for games with continuous strategy space," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 344-375.
    4. Oyama, Daisuke, 2009. "Agglomeration under forward-looking expectations: Potentials and global stability," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 696-713, November.
    5. Minoru Osawa & Takashi Akamatsu & Yosuke Kogure, 2020. "Stochastic stability of agglomeration patterns in an urban retail model," Papers 2011.06778, arXiv.org.
    6. Patrick Maillé & Peter Reichl & Bruno Tuffin, 2011. "Interplay between security providers, consumers, and attackers: a weighted congestion game approach," Post-Print inria-00560807, HAL.
    7. Osawa, Minoru & Akamatsu, Takashi, 2020. "Equilibrium refinement for a model of non-monocentric internal structures of cities: A potential game approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    8. Ratul Lahkar, 2017. "Large Population Aggregative Potential Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 443-467, September.
    9. Itai Arieli & H Peyton Young, 2011. "Stochastic Learning Dynamics and Speed of Convergence in Population Games," Economics Series Working Papers 570, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    10. Sandholm, William H., 2010. "Decompositions and potentials for normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 446-456, November.
    11. Sandholm, William H., 2015. "Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    12. Sandholm, William H. & Staudigl, Mathias, 2016. "Large Deviations and Stochastic Stability in the Small Noise Double Limit, II: The Logit Model," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 506, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    13. David González-Sánchez & Onésimo Hernández-Lerma, 2014. "Dynamic Potential Games: The Discrete-Time Stochastic Case," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 309-328, September.
    14. Hofbauer, Josef & Sandholm, William H., 2009. "Stable games and their dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1665-1693.4, July.
    15. Michael S. Harr'e, 2018. "Multi-agent Economics and the Emergence of Critical Markets," Papers 1809.01332, arXiv.org.
    16. William Sandholm, 2014. "Probabilistic Interpretations of Integrability for Game Dynamics," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 95-106, March.

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    Population games Potential games;

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