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Evolution of theories of mind

  • Mohlin, Erik

This paper studies the evolution of peoplesʼ models of how other people think – their theories of mind. This is formalized within the level-k model, which postulates a hierarchy of types, such that type k plays a k times iterated best response to the uniform distribution. It is found that, under plausible conditions, lower types co-exist with higher types. The results are extended to a model of learning, in which type k plays a k times iterated best response the average of past play. The model is also extended to allow for partial observability of the opponentʼs type.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 75 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 299-318

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:1:p:299-318
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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