When Does Communication Improve Coordination?
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- Tore Ellingsen & Robert Östling, 2010. "When Does Communication Improve Coordination?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1695-1724, September.
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- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2007-12-08 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2007-12-08 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-12-08 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-12-08 (Game Theory)
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