Communication, Computability and Common Interest Games
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- Anderlini, Luca, 1999. "Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-37, April.
- Anderlini, L., 1990. "Communication, Computability And Common Interest Games," Papers 159, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
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More about this item
KeywordsCommon Interest Games; Computability; Pre-play Communication;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
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