Measuring conflict and power in strategic settings
This is a quantitative approach to measuring conflict and power in strategic settings: noncooperative games (with cardinal or ordinal utilities) and blockings (without any preference specification). A (0, 1)-ranged index is provided, taking its minimum on common interest games, and its maximum on a newly introduced class termed “full conflict” games.
Volume (Year): 2 (2009)
Issue (Month): ()
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