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Communication, Complexity, and Evolutionary Stability

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  • Wärneryd, K.E.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

In games with costless preplay communication, some strategies are more complex than others in the sense that they induce a finer partition of the set of states of the world. This paper shows that if the concept of evolutionary stability, which is argued to be a natural solution concept for communication games, is modified to take lexicographic complexity preferences into account, then for a class of games of common interest only communication strategies that induce payoff-dominant Nash outcomes of the underlying game are stable.
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Suggested Citation

  • Wärneryd, K.E., 1993. "Communication, Complexity, and Evolutionary Stability," Other publications TiSEM 9fdde4d5-774a-4e67-9be1-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:9fdde4d5-774a-4e67-9be1-30e8b6af65aa
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Warneryd, Karl, 1991. "Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 375-378, August.
    2. Ben-Porath, Elchanan & Dekel, Eddie, 1992. "Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 36-51.
    3. Aumann, Robert J. & Sorin, Sylvain, 1989. "Cooperation and bounded recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-39, March.
    4. Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
    5. Farrell, Joseph, 1988. "Communication, coordination and Nash equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 209-214.
    6. Anderlini, Luca, 1999. "Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-37, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefano Demichelis & Jorgen W. Weibull, 2008. "Language, Meaning, and Games: A Model of Communication, Coordination, and Evolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1292-1311, September.
    2. Heller, Yuval & Mohlin, Erik, 2019. "Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 223-247.

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