Communication, Computability And Common Interest Games
This paper provides a theory of equilibrium selection for one-shot two- player finite-action strategic-form common interest games. A single round of costless unlimited pre-play communication is allowed. Players are restricted to use strategies which are computable in the sense of Church's thesis. The equilibrium notion used involves perturbations which are themselves computable. The only equilibrium payoff vector which survives these strategic restrictions and the computable perturbations is the unique Pareto-efficient one.
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|Date of creation:||1990|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE, RESEARCH PROJECT ON RISK, INFORMATION AND QUANTITY SIGNALS IN ECONOMICS(E.S.R.C.), DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED ECONOMICS, SIDGWICK AV. CAMBRIDGE CB3 9DEDE U.K..|
Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/
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