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Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games

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  • Anderlini, Luca

Abstract

This paper provides a theory of equilibrium selection for one-shot two- player finite-action strategic-form common interest games. A single round of costless unlimited pre-play communication is allowed. Players are restricted to use strategies which are computable in the sense of Church's thesis. The equilibrium notion used involves perturbations which are themselves computable. The only equilibrium payoff vector which survives these strategic restrictions and the computable perturbations is the unique Pareto-efficient one.
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(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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  • Anderlini, Luca, 1999. "Communication, Computability, and Common Interest Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 1-37, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:27:y:1999:i:1:p:1-37
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    Cited by:

    1. Carlsson, Hans & van Damme, Eric, 1993. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 989-1018, September.
    2. van Damme, E.E.C., 1991. "Equilibrium selection in 2 x 2 games (Paper presented at the XV Simposio de Anàlisis Económico, Barcelona, 17-19 December, 1990)," Other publications TiSEM b7e92385-091e-4109-852a-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Karl WÄrneryd, 1998. "Communication, complexity, and evolutionary stability," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(4), pages 599-609.
    4. Anderlini, Luca, 1998. "Forecasting errors and bounded rationality: An example," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 71-90, September.
    5. Blume, Lawrence & Easley, David & Kleinberg, Jon & Kleinberg, Robert & Tardos, Éva, 2015. "Introduction to computer science and economic theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 1-13.
    6. Tore Ellingsen & Robert Östling, 2010. "When Does Communication Improve Coordination?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(4), pages 1695-1724, September.
    7. Anderlini, Luca & Sabourian, Hamid, 2001. "Cooperation and computability in n-player games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 99-137, September.
    8. Gerber, Anke & Hens, Thorsten & Vogt, Bodo, 2010. "Rational investor sentiment in a repeated stochastic game with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 669-704, December.
    9. Lauren Larrouy, 2015. "Revisiting Methodological Individualism in Game Theory: The Contributions of Schelling and Bacharach," GREDEG Working Papers 2015-14, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    10. Giovanni Rossi, 2009. "Measuring conflict and power in strategic settings," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 19(2), pages 75-104.
    11. Battalio,R. & Samuelson,L. & Huyck,J. van, 1998. "Risk dominance, payoff dominance and probabilistic choice learning," Working papers 2, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    12. Dimitri Dubois & Marc Willinger & Phu Nguyen Van, 2008. "Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental coordination games," Working Papers 08-19, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Nov 2008.
    13. D. Dubois & M. Willinger & P. Van Nguyen, 2012. "Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental stag-hunt games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(2), pages 369-380, May.
    14. Dai, Darong, 2012. "On the existence and stability of Pareto optimal endogenous matching with fairness," MPRA Paper 40457, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. K. Binmore & L. Samuelson, 2010. "Evolutionary Stability in Repeated Games Played by Finite Automata," Levine's Working Paper Archive 561, David K. Levine.
    16. Keser, Claudia & Vogt, Bodo, 2000. "Why do experimental subjects choose an equilibrium which is neither risk nor payoff dominant," Papers 00-40, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    17. Fay, Scott, 2008. "Selling an opaque product through an intermediary: The case of disguising one's product," Journal of Retailing, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 59-75.
    18. Andrew Colman & Michael Bacharach, 1997. "Payoff Dominance And The Stackelberg Heuristic," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, July.
    19. Anke Gerbery & Thorsten Hensz & Bodo Vogtx, 2010. "Rational Investor Sentimentina Repeated Stochastic Game with Imperfect Monitoring," Post-Print hal-00911824, HAL.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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