IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jothpo/v4y1992i1p53-66.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Generic Negotiation Game

Author

Listed:
  • Steven J. Brams

Abstract

A generic Negotiation Game (NG) is used to model a conflict between two parties seeking to resolve their differences and reach a settlement. NG is a 2 × 2 non-constant-sum symmetric game that is `generic' in the sense that its payoffs, which are assumed to be cardinal, are only incompletely specified. Consequently, conclusions drawn about it are applicable to all games with which it is consistent, including such well-known games as Prisoners' Dilemma, Chicken, Deadlock and Stag Hunt. NG may be in exactly one of four mutually exclusive `states', with different pure-strategy Nash equilibria associated with each state: (1) conflict alone; (2) cooperation alone; (3) a combination of conflict and cooperation; and (4) two win-lose outcomes, each of which favors a different player. The most potent force driving NG toward state (2) is reducing the difference between winning and losing; increasing the rewards of cooperation and the penalties of conflict are not as helpful unless they occur in tandem. Normative implications of these results for encouraging negotiated settlements are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven J. Brams, 1992. "A Generic Negotiation Game," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(1), pages 53-66, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:53-66
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692892004001003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951692892004001003
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0951692892004001003?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Steven J. Brams & Ben D. Mor, 1993. "When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory?," Rationality and Society, , vol. 5(4), pages 432-454, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Steven J. Brams & Ann E. Doherty, 1993. "Intransigence in Negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 692-708, December.
    2. Giovanni Rossi, 2009. "Measuring conflict and power in strategic settings," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 19(2), pages 75-104.
    3. Karbowski, Adam, 2019. "Greed and fear in downstream R&D games," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 32, pages 63-76.
    4. Daniel Arce, 1997. "Correlated strategies as Institutions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 271-285, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Steven J. Brams & Walter Mattli, 1993. "Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 12(2), pages 1-39, February.
    2. Steven J. Brams, 1997. "Game Theory And Emotions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 9(1), pages 91-124, February.
    3. Ben D. Mor & Zeev Maoz, 1999. "Learning and the Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries: a Strategic Approach," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 17(1), pages 1-48, February.
    4. Ben D. Mor, 1995. "Crisis Initiation and Misperception," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 7(3), pages 351-367, July.
    5. Steven J. Brams, 2001. "Response to Randall Stone," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(2), pages 245-254, April.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:53-66. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.