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Intransigence in Negotiations

Author

Listed:
  • Steven J. Brams

    (New York University)

  • Ann E. Doherty

    (Newton Centre, MA)

Abstract

Three-party negotiations are analyzed in which the players are able not only to rank alternatives but also have a preference for impasse. In a dynamic model, players progressively invoke fallback positions to try to prevent inferior outcomes from being implemented in a game of incomplete information. A player's intransigence, or unwillingness to retreat to fallback positions, generally works to his or her advantage. Greater size—or, equivalently, an enhanced ability to effect preferred outcomes—also helps, but intransigence is a potent force by itself. In fact, intransigence may prevail despite the fact that there is a so-called Condorcet alternative that could defeat it and all other alternatives. The analysis illuminates the rational basis of disagreement and why it develops in the manner it does. Extensions of the dynamic model are discussed, including making the preferences of the players for impasse endogenous.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven J. Brams & Ann E. Doherty, 1993. "Intransigence in Negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(4), pages 692-708, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:37:y:1993:i:4:p:692-708
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002793037004006
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kalyan Chatterjee & William Samuelson, 1983. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 835-851, October.
    2. Steven J. Brams, 1992. "A Generic Negotiation Game," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(1), pages 53-66, January.
    3. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-637, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Scharpf, Fritz W. & Mohr, Matthias, 1994. "Efficient self-coordination in policy networks: A simulation study," MPIfG Discussion Paper 94/1, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    2. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2001. "Fallback Bargaining," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 287-316, July.
    3. Ali Nasiri Khiavi & Mehdi Vafakhah & Seyed Hamidreza Sadeghi, 2022. "Comparative prioritization of sub-watersheds based on Flood Generation potential using physical, hydrological and co-managerial approaches," Water Resources Management: An International Journal, Published for the European Water Resources Association (EWRA), Springer;European Water Resources Association (EWRA), vol. 36(6), pages 1897-1917, April.
    4. Ellen Lust-Okar & A.F.K. Organski, 2002. "Coalitions and Conflict: the Case of the Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations Over the West Bank," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 19(2), pages 23-58, September.
    5. Lester A. Zeager, "undated". "Negotiations for Refugee Repatriation or Local Settlement: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Working Papers 9730, East Carolina University, Department of Economics.

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