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Strategically Simple Mechanisms

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  • Tilman Borgers
  • Jiangtao Li

Abstract

We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call "strategic simplicity," and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms, strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be strategically simple if choices can be based on first-order beliefs about the other agents' preferences and first-order certainty about the other agents' rationality alone, and there is no need for agents to form higher-order beliefs, because such beliefs are irrelevant to the optimal strategies. All dominant strategy mechanisms are strategically simple. But many more mechanisms are strategically simple. In particular, strategically simple mechanisms may be more flexible than dominant strategy mechanisms in the bilateral trade problem and the voting problem.

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  • Tilman Borgers & Jiangtao Li, 2018. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," Papers 1812.00849, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1812.00849
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    Cited by:

    1. Margarita Kirneva & Matias Nunez, 2021. "Voting by Simultaneous Vetoes," Working Papers 2021-08, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    2. Hakimov, Rustamdjan & Kübler, Dorothea, 2021. "Experiments on centralized school choice and college admissions: a survey," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 24(2), pages 434-488.
    3. Jon X. Eguia & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2021. "Implementation by Vote-Buying Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(9), pages 2811-2828, September.
    4. Marek Pycia & Peter Troyan, 2021. "A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design," ECON - Working Papers 393, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    5. Hagen, Martin & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2021. "Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    6. Crawford, Vincent P., 2021. "Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 80-101.
    7. Kneeland, Terri, 2022. "Mechanism design with level-k types: Theory and an application to bilateral trade," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    8. Mehmet Barlo & Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2022. "Computational implementation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(4), pages 605-633, December.
    9. Bnaya Dreyfuss & Ofer Glicksohn & Ori Heffetz & Assaf Romm, 2022. "Deferred Acceptance with News Utility," NBER Working Papers 30635, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Itai Arieli & Yakov Babichenko & Fedor Sandomirskiy, 2023. "Persuasion as Transportation," Papers 2307.07672, arXiv.org.
    11. Giertz, Jan-Paul & Stracke, Stefan, 2019. "Strategische Personalplanung: Praxiswissen Betriebsvereinbarungen," Study / edition der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Düsseldorf, volume 127, number 433, June.
    12. He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2022. "Correlation-robust auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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