Quantal response equilibrium and rationalizability: Inside the black box

This paper aims to connect epistemic and behavioral game theory by examining the epistemic foundations of quantal response equilibrium (QRE) in static games. We focus on how much information agents possess about the probability distributions of idiosyncratic payoff shocks, in addition to the standard assumptions of rationality and common belief in rationality. When these distributions are transparent, we obtain a solution concept called Δp-rationalizability, which includes action distributions derived from QRE; we also give a condition under which this relationship holds true in reverse. When agents only have common belief in the monotonicity of these distributions (for example, extreme value distributions), we obtain another solution concept called ΔM-rationalizability, which includes action distributions derived from rank-dependent choice equilibrium, a parameter-free variant of QRE. Our solution concepts also provide insights for interpreting experimental and empirical data.