On the Selection of Arbitrators
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DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.275829
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- Geoffroy de Clippel & Kfir Eliaz & Brian Knight, 2014. "On the Selection of Arbitrators," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3434-3458, November.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Kfir Eliaz & Brian Knight, 2012. "On the Selection of Arbitrators," Working Papers 2012-8, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Eliaz, Kfir & de Clippel, Geoffroy & Kinght, Brian, 2011. "On the Selection of Arbitrators," CEPR Discussion Papers 8724, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Keywords
Financial Economics;JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
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