An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators
This paper analyzes alternative mechanisms for the selection of arbitrators. The authors review key institutional features of the threemost prevalent mechanisms for selecting arbitrators: rank/veto, alternate strike, and rotating panel. They present a more formal analysis in which these mechanisms are treated as economic games, andanalyze the alternative mechanisms in terms of the incentives they provide for strategic behavior and the efficiency of any equilibrium strategies that exist. Some implications of varying selected parametersof each mechanism are derived and the general role of arbitrator selection mechanisms in the process of bargaining under the threat ofarbitration are considered. Copyright 1986 by American Economic Association.
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Volume (Year): 76 (1986)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Orley Ashenfelter, 1985. "Evidence on US Experiences with Dispute Resolution Systems," Working Papers 565, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Orley Ashenfelter & David Bloom, 1983. "The Pitfalls in Judging Arbitrator Impartiality by Win-Loss Tallies Under Final-Offer Arbitration," Working Papers 543, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- Crawford, Vincent P, 1979. "On Compulsory-Arbitration Schemes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(1), pages 131-59, February.
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