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Negotiator Behavior Under Arbitration

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  • David E. Bloom
  • Christopher L. Cavanagh

Abstract

The emerging empirical literature on the economics of arbitration has focused primarily on the behavior of arbitrators under alternative forms of arbitration. This article suggests that it is natural for empirical economists to now expand their focus to include issues related to the behavior of negotiators. In this connection, three key aspects of negotiator behavior are discussed: (1) the decision to settle a dispute voluntarily or to proceed to arbitration; (2) the strategy for selecting an arbitrator; and (3) the final bargaining position to advance before an arbitrator.

Suggested Citation

  • David E. Bloom & Christopher L. Cavanagh, 1987. "Negotiator Behavior Under Arbitration," NBER Working Papers 2211, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2211
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Crawford, Vincent P, 1979. "On Compulsory-Arbitration Schemes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(1), pages 131-159, February.
    2. Geanakoplos, John D. & Polemarchakis, Heraklis M., 1982. "We can't disagree forever," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 192-200, October.
    3. Henry S. Farber, 1980. "An Analysis of Final-Offer Arbitration," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(4), pages 683-705, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Brian P. McCall, 1990. "Interest Arbitration and the Incentive to Bargain," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(1), pages 151-167, March.

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