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L'analyse économique d'un mode de résolution des litiges : l'arbitrage

  • Nathalie Chappe
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    [eng] Arbitration is a procedure whereby the disputing parties present their cases to a third party who makes a binding decision. In France, it is not largely used, whereas in the United States arbitration has been just routine for several decades. So, the economics literature on arbitration is significant. We focus on the analysis on the arbitration process. Two major procedures of arbitration exist. In conventional arbitration, the arbitrator can make the decision he wants. He can not do so in final offer arbitration. He is constrained to make a decision that is equal to the defendant offer or to the plaintiff offer. In each procedure, we study first the arbitrator behavior, then the parties one's. [fre] L'arbitrage est une procédure de résolution des conflits qui consiste à faire trancher un litige par un tiers dont la sentence a la même autorité que celle d'un juge. Ce procédé qui émerge en France est une véritable institution outre-Atlantique. Nous présentons les principaux résultats des analyses sur la procédure d'arbitrage en elle-même et éludons les questions liées à la comparaison des modes de résolutions alternatifs des litiges. Aux Etats-Unis, il existe différentes formes d'arbitrage qui se dif- férencient par la liberté accordée à l'arbitre dans le choix de sa sentence. Dans l'arbitrage conventionnel, le choix de l'arbitre n'est pas contraint, alors que dans l'arbitrage entre offres finales il est limité aux seules propositions des parties. Ces deux procédures sont présentées d'abord en étudiant le comportement de l'arbitre, puis celui des parties.

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    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/rfeco.2001.1506
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    File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/rfeco_0769-0479_2001_num_15_4_1506
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    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue française d'économie.

    Volume (Year): 15 (2001)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 187-208

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_2001_num_15_4_1506
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.2001.1506
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/rfeco

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    1. Shavell, Steven, 1995. "Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 1-28, January.
    2. Henry S. Farber, 1981. "Splitting-the-Difference in Interest Arbitration," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 35(1), pages 70-77, October.
    3. Henry S. Farber & Harry C. Katz, 1979. "Interest Arbitration, Outcomes, and the Incentive to Bargain," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 33(1), pages 55-63, October.
    4. Max H. Bazerman & Henry S. Farber, 1985. "Arbitrator Decision Making: When are Final Offers Important?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 39(1), pages 76-89, October.
    5. Max H. Bazerman, 1985. "Norms of Distributive Justice in Interest Arbitration," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 38(4), pages 558-570, July.
    6. Robert Gibbons, 1988. "Learning In Equilibrium Models of Arbitration," NBER Working Papers 2547, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. David E. Bloom, 1986. "Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior Under Conventional Arbitration," NBER Working Papers 1841, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Zeng, Dao-Zhi & Nakamura, Shinya & Ibaraki, Toshihide, 1996. "Double-offer arbitration," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 147-170, June.
    9. Thomas A. Kochan & Jean Baderschneider, 1978. "Dependence on Impasse Procedures: Police and Firefighters in New York State," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 31(4), pages 431-449, July.
    10. Vincent P. Crawford, 1982. "Compulsory Arbitration, Arbitral Risk and Negotiated Settlements: A Case Study in Bargaining under Imperfect Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 69-82.
    11. Marburger, Daniel R., 1993. "Exchangeable arbitrator behavior : A closer look," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 219-220.
    12. Crawford, Vincent P, 1981. "Arbitration and Conflict Resolution in Labor-Management Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 205-10, May.
    13. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, September.
    14. Crawford, Vincent P, 1979. "On Compulsory-Arbitration Schemes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(1), pages 131-59, February.
    15. Craig A. Olson & Gregory G. Dell'omo & Paul Jarley, 1992. "A Comparison of Interest Arbitrator Decisionmaking in Experimental and Field Settings," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 45(4), pages 711-723, July.
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