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An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems

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  • Ashenfelter, Orley, et al

Abstract

This paper reports the results of a systematic experimental comparison of the effect of alternative arbitration systems on dispute rates. The three main findings indicate that (1) dispute rates are inversely related to the monetary costs of disputes; (2) the dispute rate in a final-offer arbitration system is at least as high as the dispute rate in a comparable conventional arbitration system; and (3) dispute rates are inversely related to the uncertainty costs of disputes, indicating that some bargainers behave as if they were risk averse. Coauthors are Janet Currie, Henry S. Farber, and Matthew Spiegel. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.

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  • Ashenfelter, Orley, et al, 1992. "An Experimental Comparison of Dispute Rates in Alternative Arbitration Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(6), pages 1407-1433, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:60:y:1992:i:6:p:1407-33
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    1. Currie, J. & Mcconnell, S., 1989. "Strikes And Arbitration In The Public Sector: Can Legislation Reduce Dispute Costs?," Papers 360, London School of Economics - Centre for Labour Economics.
    2. Bloom, David E & Cavanagh, Christopher L, 1986. "An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 408-422, June.
    3. Henry S. Farber & Harry C. Katz, 1979. "Interest Arbitration, Outcomes, and the Incentive to Bargain," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 33(1), pages 55-63, October.
    4. Max H. Bazerman & Henry S. Farber, 1985. "Arbitrator Decision Making: When are Final Offers Important?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 39(1), pages 76-89, October.
    5. Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman, 1987. "Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes."," NBER Working Papers 2139, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Tracy, Joseph S, 1986. "An Investigation into the Determinants of U.S. Strike Activity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 423-436, June.
    7. Orley Ashenfelter & David Bloom, 1981. "Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 526, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    8. Harrison, Glenn W, 1989. "Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 749-762, September.
    9. Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman, 1989. "Divergent Expectations as a Cause of Disagreement in Bargaining: Evidence from a Comparison of Arbitration Schemes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 104(1), pages 99-120.
    10. Kalyan Chatterjee & William Samuelson, 1983. "Bargaining under Incomplete Information," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 31(5), pages 835-851, October.
    11. McConnell, Sheena, 1989. "Strikes, Wages, and Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 801-815, September.
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    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence

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