IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/jeclit/v24y1986i1p41-86.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Unionism Comes to the Public Sector

Author

Listed:
  • Freeman, Richard B

Abstract

This paper argues that public sector labor relations is best understood in a framework that focuses on unions' ability to shift demand curves rather than to raise wages, as is the case in the private sector. It reviews the public sector labor relations literature and finds that: (i) public sector unionism has flourished as a result of changes in laws; (2) the effects of public sector unions on wages are likely to have been underestimated; (3) public sector unions have a somewhat different effect on wage structures than do private sector unions; (4) compulsory arbitration reduces strikes with no clearcut impact on the level of wage settlements; (5) public sector unions have diverse effects on non-wage outcomes as do private sector unions. In terms of evaluating public sector unionism, the paper argues that by raising both the cost of public services (taxes) and the amount of services public sector unionism involves a different welfare calculus than private sector unionism.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Freeman, Richard B, 1986. "Unionism Comes to the Public Sector," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 24(1), pages 41-86, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:24:y:1986:i:1:p:41-86
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/fcgi-bin/jstor/listjournal.fcg/00220515/.21-.30
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William S. Fox & Michael H. Wince, 1976. "The Structure and Determinants of Occupational Militancy among Public School Teachers," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 30(1), pages 47-58, October.
    2. Crawford, Vincent P, 1979. "On Compulsory-Arbitration Schemes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(1), pages 131-159, February.
    3. Richard J. Butler & Ronald G. Ehrenberg, 1981. "Estimating the Narcotic Effect of Public Sector Impasse Procedures," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 35(1), pages 3-20, October.
    4. Don Hellriegel & Wendell French & Richard B. Peterson, 1970. "Collective Negotiations and Teachers: A Behavioral Analysis," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 23(3), pages 380-396, April.
    5. Russell L. Smith & Anne H. Hopkins, 1979. "Public Employee Attitudes toward Unions," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 32(4), pages 484-495, July.
    6. Casey Ichniowski, 1980. "Economic Effects of the Firefighters' Union," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 33(2), pages 198-211, January.
    7. J. Joseph Loewenberg, 1970. "Compulsory Arbitration for Police and Fire Fighters in Pennsylvania in 1968," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 23(3), pages 367-379, April.
    8. A.V. Subbarao, 1978. "The Impact of Binding Interest Arbitration on Negotiation and Process Outcome," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 22(1), pages 79-103, March.
    9. Ehrenberg, Ronald G, 1973. "The Demand for State and Local Government Employees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 366-379, June.
    10. Sharon P. Smith, 1976. "Pay Differentials between Federal Government and Private Sector Workers," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 29(2), pages 179-197, January.
    11. Arnold R. Weber, 1969. "Paradise Lost; Or Whatever Happened to the Chicago Social Workers?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 22(3), pages 323-338, April.
    12. Myron D. Fottler, 1977. "The Union Impact on Hospital Wages," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 30(3), pages 342-355, April.
    13. Ehrenberg, Ronald G. & Schwarz, Joshua L., 1987. "Public-sector labor markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & R. Layard (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 1219-1260, Elsevier.
    14. Daniel G. Gallagher & Richard Pegnetter, 1979. "Impasse Resolution under the Iowa Multistep Procedure," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 32(3), pages 327-338, April.
    15. Robert J. Thornton, 1975. "Monopsony and Teachers' Salaries: Some Contrary Evidence," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 28(4), pages 574-575, July.
    16. Darold T. Barnum & I. B. Helburn, 1982. "Influencing the Electorate: Experience with Referenda on Public Employee Bargaining," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 35(3), pages 330-342, April.
    17. Landon, John H & Baird, Robert N, 1971. "Monopsony in the Market for Public School Teachers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(5), pages 966-971, December.
    18. Thomas A. Kochan & Hoyt N. Wheeler, 1975. "Municipal Collective Bargaining: A Model and Analysis of Bargaining Outcomes," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 29(1), pages 46-66, October.
    19. repec:pri:indrel:dsp01hd76s0061 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Orley Ashenfelter & David Bloom, 1983. "The Pitfalls in Judging Arbitrator Impartiality by Win-Loss Tallies Under Final-Offer Arbitration," Working Papers 543, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    21. Nelson, Charles R & Kang, Heejoon, 1984. "Pitfalls in the Use of Time as an Explanatory Variable in Regression," Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, American Statistical Association, vol. 2(1), pages 73-82, January.
    22. Russell K. Schutt, 1982. "Models of Militancy: Support for Strikes and Work Actions among Public Employees," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 35(3), pages 406-422, April.
    23. Chambers, Jay G., 1977. "The impact of collective bargaining for teachers on resource allocation in public school districts," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 324-339, July.
    24. Ehrenberg, Ronald G. & Goldstein, Gerald S., 1975. "A model of public sector wage determination," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 223-245, July.
    25. David B. Ross, 1969. "The Arbitration of Public Employee Wage Disputes," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 23(1), pages 3-14, October.
    26. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Daniel R. Sherman & Joshua L. Schwarz, 1983. "Unions and Productivity in the Public Sector: A Study of Municipal Libraries," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 36(2), pages 199-213, January.
    27. William H. Baugh & Joe A. Stone, 1982. "Teachers, Unions, and Wages in the 1970s: Unionism Now Pays," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 35(3), pages 368-376, April.
    28. Harry C. Katz, 1979. "The Municipal Budgetary Response to Changing Labor Costs: The Case of San Francisco," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 32(4), pages 506-519, July.
    29. Perry, James L. & Levine, Charles H., 1976. "An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 1185-1201, December.
    30. Peter Feuille, 1979. "Selected Benefits and Costs of Compulsory Arbitration," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 33(1), pages 64-76, October.
    31. Roger Feldman & Richard Scheffler, 1982. "The Union Impact on Hospital Wages and Fringe Benefits," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 35(2), pages 196-206, January.
    32. Orley Ashenfelter, 1971. "The Effect of Unionization on Wages in the Public Sector: The Case of Fire Fighters," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 24(2), pages 191-202, January.
    33. Smith, Sharon P., 1977. "Government wage differentials," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 248-271, July.
    34. Max H. Bazerman & Henry S. Farber, 1983. "Arbitrator Decision Making: When Are Final Offers Important?," NBER Working Papers 1183, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    35. Charlotte Gold & Rodney E. Dennis & Joseph Graham III, 1978. "Reinstatement after Termination: Public School Teachers," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 31(3), pages 310-321, April.
    36. Charles R. Perry, 1979. "Teacher Bargaining: The Experience in Nine Systems," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 33(1), pages 3-17, October.
    37. Lynn Zimmer & James B. Jacobs, 1981. "Challenging the Taylor Law: Prison Guards on Strike," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 34(4), pages 531-544, July.
    38. Henry S. Farber & Harry C. Katz, 1979. "Interest Arbitration, Outcomes, and the Incentive to Bargain," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 33(1), pages 55-63, October.
    39. Thomas A. Kochan & Jean Baderschneider, 1978. "Dependence on Impasse Procedures: Police and Firefighters in New York State," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 31(4), pages 431-449, July.
    40. Raymond D. Horton, 1975. "Arbitration, Arbitrators, and the Public Interest," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 28(4), pages 497-507, July.
    41. Allen, Steven G, 1981. "An Empirical Model of Work Attendance," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 63(1), pages 77-87, February.
    42. Thomas A. Kochan & Jean Baderschneider, 1981. "Estimating the Narcotic Effect: Choosing Techniques That Fit the Problem," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 35(1), pages 21-28, October.
    43. David Shapiro, 1978. "Unions and Wages: Relative Wage Effects of Unions in the Public and Private Sectors," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 31(2), pages 193-204, January.
    44. Orley Ashenfelter & David Bloom, 1983. "The Pitfalls in Judging Arbitrator Impartiality by Win-Loss Tallies Under Final-Offer Arbitration," Working Papers 543, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    45. Orley Ashenfelter & David Bloom, 1981. "Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 526, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    46. James B. Jacobs, 1982. "The Role of Military Forces in Public Sector Labor Relations," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 35(2), pages 163-180, January.
    47. Schmenner, Roger W, 1973. "The Determination of Municipal Employee Wages," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 55(1), pages 83-90, February.
    48. Robert N. Baird & John H. Landon, 1972. "The Effects of Collective Bargaining on Public School Teachers' Salaries," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 25(3), pages 410-417, April.
    49. Linda N. Edwards & Franklin R. Edwards, 1982. "Wellington-Winter Revisited: The Case of Municipal Sanitation Collection," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 35(3), pages 307-318, April.
    50. Gary A. Moore, 1976. "The Effect of Collective Bargaining on Internal Salary Structures in the Public Schools," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 29(3), pages 352-362, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Ehrenberg, Ronald G. & Schwarz, Joshua L., 1987. "Public-sector labor markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & R. Layard (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 22, pages 1219-1260, Elsevier.
    2. Gyourko, Joseph & Tracy, Joseph, 1988. "An Analysis of Public- and Private-Sector Wages Allowing for Endogenous Choices of Both Government and Union Status," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(2), pages 229-253, April.
    3. repec:eee:labchp:v:3:y:1999:i:pc:p:3573-3630 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Gregory, Robert G. & Borland, Jeff, 1999. "Recent developments in public sector labor markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 53, pages 3573-3630, Elsevier.
    5. Duplantis, Malcolm M. & Chandler, Timothy D. & Geske, Terry G., 1995. "The growth and impact of teachers' unions in states without collective bargaining legislation," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 167-178, June.
    6. Jan Brueckner & Kevin O'Brien, 1989. "Modeling government behavior in collective bargaining: A test for self-interested bureaucrats," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 15-41, October.
    7. Keith A. Bender, 1998. "The Central Government‐Private Sector Wage Differential," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 177-220, April.
    8. Nathalie Chappe, 2001. "L'analyse économique d'un mode de résolution des litiges : l'arbitrage," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 15(4), pages 187-208.
    9. Orley Ashenfelter & David Bloom, 1981. "Models of Arbitrator Behavior: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 526, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    10. Morris M. Kleiner & Daniel L. Petree, 1988. "Unionism and Licensing of Public School Teachers: Impact on Wages and Educational Output," NBER Chapters, in: When Public Sector Workers Unionize, pages 305-322, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Pate, David S., 1985. "The demand for teachers by public school districts under three different market structures," ISU General Staff Papers 198501010800009737, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    12. Lawrence M. Spizman, 1980. "Unions, Government Services, and Public Employees," Public Finance Review, , vol. 8(4), pages 427-442, October.
    13. Bloom, David E & Cavanagh, Christopher L, 1986. "An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 408-422, June.
    14. Richard B. Freeman & Robert Valletta, 1988. "The Effects of Public Sector Labor Laws on Labor Market Institutions and Outcomes," NBER Chapters, in: When Public Sector Workers Unionize, pages 81-106, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Bernard Lentz, 1981. "Political and economic determinants of county government pay," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 253-271, January.
    16. William F. Fox & Kenneth E. Quindry, 1984. "State and Local Government Fiscal Constraints: Public Sector and Private Sector Effects," Public Finance Review, , vol. 12(4), pages 425-456, October.
    17. Janet Currie & Henry S. Farber, 1992. "Is Arbitration Addictive? Evidence From the Laboratory and the Field," NBER Working Papers 3952, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Sarah Brown & John Sessions, 2000. "Employee militancy in Britain: 1985-1990," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(13), pages 1767-1774.
    19. Cousineau, Jean-Michel, 1984. "La détermination des salaires des policiers municipaux au Québec," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 60(2), pages 186-199, juin.
    20. Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman, 1984. "The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration," NBER Working Papers 1488, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Richard P. Chaykowski, 2019. "Time to Tweak or Re-boot? Assessing the Interest Arbitration Process in Canadian Industrial Relations," C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, C.D. Howe Institute, issue 539, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:24:y:1986:i:1:p:41-86. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michael P. Albert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.