Empirical Models of Arbitrator Behavior under Conventional Arbitration
Analysis of a new set of data indicates that conventional arbi trators tend to mechanically compromise between the parties' final offers with v irtually no evidence of systematic reference to the facts of the cases. However, since there is a substantial amount of unexplained variance in the arbitrators' decisions, this evidence of mechanical compromise behavior should be viewed as characterizing theoverall operation of conventional arbitration mechanisms and not the behavior of individual arbitrators in any particular case. Indeed, the r esults are consistent with the view that individual arbitratorspay close attent ion to the facts of the cases, but that there is considerable variation in the s tructure of different arbitrators' preference functions. Copyright 1986 by MIT Press.
Volume (Year): 68 (1986)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/|
|Order Information:||Web: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journal-home.tcl?issn=00346535|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Max H. Bazerman, 1985. "Norms of Distributive Justice in Interest Arbitration," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 38(4), pages 558-570, July.
- Farber, Henry S & Bazerman, Max H, 1986. "The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 819-44, July.
- Farber, Henry S & Bazerman, Max H, 1986. "The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1503-28, November.
- Orley Ashenfelter, 1985. "Evidence on US Experiences with Dispute Resolution Systems," Working Papers 565, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:68:y:1986:i:4:p:578-85. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kristin Waites)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.