Do voters vote ideologically?
In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote "ideologically" (i.e., they always vote for the candidate who is ideologically "closest" to them) testable or falsifiable? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election, the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is irrefutable, regardless of the number of candidates competing in the election. On the other hand, using data on how the same individuals vote in multiple elections, the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is potentially falsifiable, and we provide general conditions under which the hypothesis can be tested.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Varian, Hal R, 1982. "The Nonparametric Approach to Demand Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 945-73, July.
- Berry, Steven & Levinsohn, James & Pakes, Ariel, 1995. "Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(4), pages 841-90, July.
- K. K. Lancaster, 2010. "A New Approach to Consumer Theory," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1385, David K. Levine.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
- Abdul Ghafar Noury & Simon Hix & Gérard Roland, 2006. "Dimensions of politics in the European Parliament," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7750, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Eliaz, Kfir & Ok, Efe A., 2006. "Indifference or indecisiveness? Choice-theoretic foundations of incomplete preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 61-86, July.
- Kelvin J. Lancaster, 1966. "A New Approach to Consumer Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74, pages 132.
- Steven Berry & Ariel Pakes, 2007. "The Pure Characteristics Demand Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1193-1225, November.
- Sen, Amartya K, 1971. "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(115), pages 307-17, July.
- Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti, 2007. "Sequentially Rationalizable Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(5), pages 1824-1839, December.
- Martin Browning & Laura Blow, 2006.
"Revealed Preference Analysis of Characteristics Models,"
Economics Series Working Papers
282, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Laura Blow & Martin Browning & Ian Crawford, 2008. "Revealed Preference Analysis of Characteristics Models," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 371-389.
- Laura Blow & Martin Browning & Ian Crawford, 2005. "Revealed preference analysis of characteristics models," CAM Working Papers 2005-04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics.
- Laura Blow & Martin Browning & Ian Crawford, 2005. "Revealed preference analysis of characteristics models," School of Economics Discussion Papers 0305, School of Economics, University of Surrey.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521415019 is not listed on IDEAS
- Amrita Dhillon & Susana Peralta, 2002.
"Economic Theories Of Voter Turnout,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages F332-F352, June.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521425230 is not listed on IDEAS
- Stephen Coate & Michael Conlin, 2004. "A Group Rule–Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1476-1504, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:5:p:1868-1894. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.