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Designing Mechanisms, in Particular for Electoral Systems: The Majoritarian Compromise

In: Contemporary Economic Issues

Author

Listed:
  • Leonid Hurwicz

    (University of Minnesota)

  • Murat R. Sertel

    (Boğaziçi University and Turkish Academy of Sciences)

Abstract

The Majoritarian Compromise proposal, aside from its substantive merits, provides an opportunity to illustrate various aspects of mechanism and institution design, and, in particular, to clarify the concepts used in the analysis of design. Many of these concepts also underlie models used in economic analysis. What follows is an outline of some of the issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonid Hurwicz & Murat R. Sertel, 1999. "Designing Mechanisms, in Particular for Electoral Systems: The Majoritarian Compromise," International Economic Association Series, in: Murat R. Sertel (ed.), Contemporary Economic Issues, chapter 4, pages 69-88, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-14540-9_4
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-14540-9_4
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Matías Núñez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(2), pages 421-441, February.
    2. Geoffroy de Clippel & Kfir Eliaz & Brian Knight, 2014. "On the Selection of Arbitrators," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(11), pages 3434-3458, November.
    3. Núñez, Matías & Laslier, Jean-François, 2015. "Bargaining through Approval," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 63-73.
    4. Murat R. Sertel & M. Remzi Sanver, 2004. "Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(2), pages 331-347, April.
    5. Bonifacio Llamazares & Teresa Peña, 2015. "Positional Voting Systems Generated by Cumulative Standings Functions," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(5), pages 777-801, September.
    6. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2022. "Compromising on compromise rules," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 95-112, March.
    7. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour & M. Sanver, 2007. "A minimax procedure for electing committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 401-420, September.
    8. Brañas-Garza, Pablo & Espinosa, María Paz & Giritligil, Ayca E., 2022. "On the transmission of democratic values," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 885-896.
    9. Matias Nunez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules," Post-Print hal-03341697, HAL.
    10. Hayrullah Dindar & Jean Lainé, 2022. "Compromise in combinatorial vote," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 59(1), pages 175-206, July.
    11. Sinan Ertemel & Levent Kutlu & M. Remzi Sanver, 2015. "Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 45(1), pages 187-201, June.
    12. Damien Bol & Jean-François Laslier & Matías Núñez, 2022. "Two Person Bargaining Mechanisms: A Laboratory Experiment," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 31(6), pages 1145-1177, December.

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