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Bargaining through Approval

Listed author(s):
  • Matias Nunez

    ()

    (THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - Université de Cergy Pontoise - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-François Laslier

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC))

The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their mean utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-01310223.

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Date of creation: Oct 2015
Publication status: Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, 2015, 60, pp.63-73. <10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.015>
Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01310223
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.06.015
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01310223
Contact details of provider: Web page: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

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  1. Hurwicz, Leonid & Schmeidler, David, 1978. "Construction of Outcome Functions Guaranteeing Existence and Pareto Optimality of Nash Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1447-1474, November.
  2. Donald Wittman, 1986. "Final-Offer Arbitration," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(12), pages 1551-1561, December.
  3. Ahn, David S & Oliveros, Santiago, 2013. "Approval Voting and Scoring Rules with Common Values," Economics Discussion Papers 8983, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
  4. Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki, 2013. "Partially Honest Nash Implementation:A Full Characterization," CCES Discussion Paper Series 49, Center for Research on Contemporary Economic Systems, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  5. Burak Can & Bora Erdamar & M. Sanver, 2009. "Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 123-144, August.
  6. DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, "undated". "Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1467, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Özgür Kıbrıs & Murat Sertel, 2007. "Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(3), pages 421-437, April.
  8. Ulle Endriss, 2013. "Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 335-355, March.
  9. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2009. "Nash Implementation with Partially Honest Individuals," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 920, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  10. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir & Knight, Brian, 2011. "On the Selection of Arbitrators," CEPR Discussion Papers 8724, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Tilman Börgers & Peter Postl, 2005. "Efficient Compromising," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000188, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Bouton, Laurent & Castanheira, Micael, 2008. "One Person, Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation," CEPR Discussion Papers 6695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2015. "Balancing the Power to Appoint Officers," Working Papers 696, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  14. John Conley & Simon Wilkie, 2012. "The ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution for finite choice sets," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 38(1), pages 23-42, January.
  15. Sebastien Courtin & Matias Nunez, 2013. "A Map of Approval Voting Equilibria Outcomes," Working Papers hal-00914887, HAL.
  16. Makoto Tanaka & Ryo-ichi Nagahisa, 2002. "An axiomatization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution when the feasible sets can be finite," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(4), pages 751-761.
  17. Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," Discussion Papers 1214, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  18. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2006. "Role of Honesty in Full Implementation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-405, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  19. GOERTZ, Johanna M. & MANIQUET, François, 2009. "On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules," CORE Discussion Papers 2009026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  20. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Eliaz, Kfir, 2012. "Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(1), January.
  21. Dhillon, Amrita & Lockwood, Ben, 2004. "When are plurality rule voting games dominance-solvable?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 55-75, January.
  22. Salvador Barberà & Danilo Coelho, 2004. "On the rule of K names," Working Papers 264, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  23. Jean-François Laslier & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2013. "An Incentive-Compatible Condorcet Jury Theorem," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(1), pages 84-108, 01.
  24. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  25. Kartik, Navin & Tercieux, Olivier, 2012. "Implementation with evidence," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(2), May.
  26. Nejat Anbarci, 2006. "Finite Alternating-Move Arbitration Schemes and the Equal Area Solution," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 21-50, 08.
  27. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  28. Kelly, Jerry S, 1977. "Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 439-446, March.
  29. Francesco Sinopoli & Bhaskar Dutta & Jean-François Laslier, 2006. "Approval voting: three examples," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 27-38, December.
  30. repec:esx:essedp:732 is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Marco Mariotti, 1998. "Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(3), pages 413-421.
  32. repec:ulb:ulbeco:2013/162238 is not listed on IDEAS
  33. Jean-François Laslier, 2009. "The Leader rule: a model of strategic approval voting in a large electorate," Post-Print hal-00363218, HAL.
  34. Pazner, Elisha A., 1977. "Pitfalls in the theory of fairness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 458-466, April.
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