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Reaching Consensus Through Simultaneous Bargaining

Listed author(s):
  • Jean-François Laslier

    ()

    (CNRS and Paris School of Economics)

  • Matías Núñez

    ()

    (CNRS and THEMA, University of Cergy-Pontoise)

  • Carlos Pimienta

    ()

    (School of Economics, UNSW Business School, UNSW)

We propose a two-player bargaining game where each player simultaneously proposes a set of lotteries on a finite set of alternatives. If the two sets have elements in common the outcome is selected by the uniform probability measure over the intersection. If otherwise the sets do not intersect the outcome is selected by the uniform probability measure over the union. We show that this game always has an equilibrium in sincere strategies (i.e. such that players truthfully reveal their preferences). We also prove that every equilibrium is individually rational and consensual. If furthermore players are partially honest then every equilibrium is efficient and sincere. We use this result to fully characterize the set of equilibria of the game under partial honesty.

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File URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2015-08.pdf
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Paper provided by School of Economics, The University of New South Wales in its series Discussion Papers with number 2015-08.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2015
Handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2015-08
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  1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1181-1206_08 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Role of honesty in full implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 353-359, March.
  4. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2008. "Behavioral aspects of implementation theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 161-164, July.
  5. Bhaskar Dutta & Arunava Sen, 1991. "A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 121-128.
  6. repec:cup:apsrev:v:81:y:1987:i:02:p:509-524_19 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. repec:cup:apsrev:v:94:y:2000:i:01:p:73-88_22 is not listed on IDEAS
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