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Iterative Dominance and Sequential Bargaining

  • Christopher J. Tyson

    ()

    (Nuffield College, Oxford University, UK)

A new game theoretic analysis of finite horizon, complete information bargaining is advanced. The extensive form reflects an attempt to model unstructured negotiations, in which the negotiants can gain no artificial advantage from the details of the bargaining protocol. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies selects a unique outcome. These conditions serve to preclude embedded static bargaining problems of the sort that have historically been deemed indeterminate, thereby ensuring that the dynamic problems analyzed will be resolvable without imposing any particular static theory.

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File URL: http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/economics/papers/2004/w23/270804.pdf
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Paper provided by Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford in its series Economics Papers with number 2004-W23.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 27 Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nuf:econwp:0423
Contact details of provider: Web page: https://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/economics/

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  19. Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(2), pages 463-477.
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