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Bargaining

  • Roberto Serrano

    ()

    (Brown University and IMDEA Social Sciences)

This article is a survey on bargaining theory. The focus is the game theoretic approach to bargaining, both on its axiomatic and strategic counterparts. The application of bargaining theory to large markets and its connections with competitive allocations are also discussed.

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File URL: http://repec.imdea.org/pdf/imdea-wp2007-06.pdf
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Paper provided by Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales in its series Working Papers with number 2007-06.

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Date of creation: 28 Feb 2007
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Publication status: Published in Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence Blume (eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition, London: McMillan
Handle: RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2007-06
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  1. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
  2. Evans, Robert, 1989. "Sequential Bargaining with Correlated Values," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 499-510, October.
  3. Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-99, March.
  4. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  5. Baliga, S. & Serrano, R., 1993. "Multilateral Bargaining With Imperfect Information," Papers 193, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
  6. Roberto Serrano, 2000. "Decentralized Information and the Walrasian Outcome:A Pairwise Meetings Market with Private Values," Working Papers 2000-13, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  7. Volij, Oscar & Serrano, Roberto, 2000. "Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition," Staff General Research Papers 5107, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  8. Gale, Douglas, 1987. "Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 20-54, October.
  9. Wolinsky, Asher, 1990. "Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 1-23, January.
  10. Inderst, Roman, 2000. "Multi-issue Bargaining with Endogenous Agenda," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 64-82, January.
  11. VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 1996. "Rationalizability and Equilibrium in N-Person Sequential Bargaining," CORE Discussion Papers 1996041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1993. "Sequential Bargaining and Competition," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 353-63, April.
  13. Binmore, K. & Osborne, M.J. & Rubinstein, A., 1989. "Noncooperative Models Of Bargaining," Papers 89-26, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  14. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521643306 is not listed on IDEAS
  15. Fershtman, Chaim, 1990. "The importance of the agenda in bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 224-238, September.
  16. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  17. Mortensen, Dale T, 1982. "Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 968-79, December.
  18. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
  19. Arial Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 623, David K. Levine.
  20. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, . "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  21. Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  22. Rubinstein, Ariel & Safra, Zvi & Thomson, William, 1992. "On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1171-86, September.
  23. Serrano, Roberto & Yosha, Oved, 1993. "Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings: The One Sided Information Case," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 481-99, July.
  24. Fershtman, Chaim, 2000. "A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 216-227, February.
  25. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-18, May.
  26. D. Abreu & F. Gul, 1998. "Bargaining and Reputation," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s9, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  27. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier.
  28. Raquel Fernandez & Jacob Glazer, 1989. "Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents," NBER Working Papers 3108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Roberto Serrano & Sandeep Baliga, 2001. "Multilateral negotiations with private side-deals: a multiplicity example," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(1), pages 1-7.
  30. Jehiel, Philippe & Benny Moldovanu, 1993. "Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with "Externalities"," Discussion Paper Serie B 234, University of Bonn, Germany.
  31. Max Blouin & Roberto Serrano, 1998. "A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States," Working Papers 98-5, Brown University, Department of Economics, revised 10 Aug 1998.
  32. Watson, Joel, 1998. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(3), pages 573-94, July.
  33. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1991. "A Note on Bargaining over a Finite Number of Feasible Agreements," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 290-92, July.
  34. Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1988. "On Delay in Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 601-11, May.
  35. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Wen, Quan, 1995. "Perfect Equilibria in Negotiation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(3), pages 545-65, May.
  36. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
  37. Vincent, Daniel R., 1989. "Bargaining with common values," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 47-62, June.
  38. Avery Christopher & Zemsky Peter B., 1994. "Money Burning and Multiple Equilibria in Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 154-168, September.
  39. Weinberger, Catherine J., 2000. "Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 262-293, May.
  40. Satterthwaite, Mark A & Williams, Steven R, 1989. "The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 477-98, October.
  41. Rustichini, Aldo & Satterthwaite, Mark A & Williams, Steven R, 1994. "Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 1041-63, September.
  42. Gresik, Thomas A. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1989. "The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 304-332, June.
  43. Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Horstmann, Ignatius J, 1997. "Bargaining Frictions, Bargaining Procedures and Implied Costs in Multiple-Issue Bargaining," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 64(256), pages 669-80, November.
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