Multilateral negotiations with private side-deals: a multiplicity example
We study a multilateral negotiation procedure that allows for "partial agreements" in which responders are told only their own shares. Applications of our model include negotiations under "joint and several liability." Unlike previous models of multilateral bargaining with exit, we find that there are multiple equilibrium outcomes.
Volume (Year): 3 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
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- VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., "undated". "Rationalizability and equilibrium in N-person sequential bargaining," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1421, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 1996. "Rationalizability and Equilibrium in N-Person Sequential Bargaining," CORE Discussion Papers 1996041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Baliga Sandeep & Serrano Roberto, 1995. "Multilateral Bargaining with Imperfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 578-589, December.
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- Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Vijay Krishna & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80.
- Baliga, S. & Serrano, R., 1995. "Negotiations with Side-Deals," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9510, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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