IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Delay in a bargaining game with contracts

  • Yi-Chun Chen

    ()

  • Xiao Luo

    ()

No abstract is available for this item.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-008-9111-5
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 65 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 339-353

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:65:y:2008:i:4:p:339-353
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2003. "Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining and the Nash Bargaining Solution," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0306, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  2. Houba, Harold & Bolt, Wilko, 2000. "Holdouts, backdating and wage negotiations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(9), pages 1783-1800, October.
  3. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Hongbin Cai, 2003. "Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 583-606, October.
  5. Baliga, S. & Serrano, R., 1993. "Multilateral Bargaining With Imperfect Information," Papers 193, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
  6. Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH, 2002. "Strategic Union Delegation and Strike Activity," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2002011, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  7. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-52, March.
  8. S. Baliga & Roberto Serrano, 1995. "Negociations with Side-Deals," Working Papers 95-9, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  9. Vincent Vannetelbosch, 1999. "Alternating-Offer Bargaining and Common Knowledge of Rationality," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 47(2), pages 111-138, October.
  10. Busch, L-A. & Wen, Q., 1991. "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model," University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers 9108, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.
  11. Quan Wen & Sang-Chul Suh, 2004. "Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 405, Econometric Society.
  12. Cai, Hongbin, 2000. "Bargaining on Behalf of a Constituency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 234-273, June.
  13. Chae, Suchan & Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1988. "The unique perfect equilibrium of an n-person bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 221-223.
  14. VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 1996. "Rationalizability and Equilibrium in N-Person Sequential Bargaining," CORE Discussion Papers 1996041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  16. Krishna, Vijay & Serrano, Roberto, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80, January.
  17. Roberto Serrano & Sandeep Baliga, 2001. "Multilateral negotiations with private side-deals: a multiplicity example," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(1), pages 1-7.
  18. Daniel Cardona-Coll, 2003. "Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 357-374, June.
  19. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October.
  20. Charles Hyde, 1997. "Bargaining And Delay: The Role Of External Information," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 81-104, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:65:y:2008:i:4:p:339-353. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

or (Christopher F. Baum)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.