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Delay in a bargaining game with contracts

  • Yi-Chun Chen

    ()

  • Xiao Luo

    ()

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-008-9111-5
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 65 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 339-353

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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:65:y:2008:i:4:p:339-353
DOI: 10.1007/s11238-008-9111-5
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/11238/PS2

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  1. Cai, Hongbin, 2000. "Bargaining on Behalf of a Constituency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 234-273, June.
  2. Hongbin Cai, 2003. "Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 22(3), pages 583-606, October.
  3. VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., . "Alternating-offer bargaining and common knowledge of rationality," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1432, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Suh, Sang-Chul & Wen, Quan, 2006. "Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 61-73, February.
  5. Charles Hyde, 1997. "Bargaining And Delay: The Role Of External Information," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 81-104, January.
  6. Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991. "Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-52, March.
  7. Ana MAULEON & Vincent J. VANNETELBOSCH, 2002. "Strategic Union Delegation and Strike Activity," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2002011, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  8. Haller, Hans & Holden, Steinar, 1990. "A letter to the editor on wage bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 232-236, October.
  9. Baliga Sandeep & Serrano Roberto, 1995. "Multilateral Bargaining with Imperfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 578-589, December.
  10. Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009. "A Course in Game Theory," Levine's Bibliography 814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Haller, Hans, 1986. "Non-cooperative bargaining of N [ges] 3 players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 11-13.
  12. S. Baliga & Roberto Serrano, 1995. "Negociations with Side-Deals," Working Papers 95-9, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  13. Busch, L-A. & Wen, Q., 1991. "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model," University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers 9108, University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations.
  14. Houba, Harold & Bolt, Wilko, 2000. "Holdouts, backdating and wage negotiations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(9), pages 1783-1800, October.
  15. Daniel Cardona-Coll, 2003. "Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 357-374, June.
  16. VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 1996. "Rationalizability and Equilibrium in N-Person Sequential Bargaining," CORE Discussion Papers 1996041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  17. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  18. Vijay Krishna & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80.
  19. Roberto Serrano & Sandeep Baliga, 2001. "Multilateral negotiations with private side-deals: a multiplicity example," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(1), pages 1-7.
  20. Chae, Suchan & Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1988. "The unique perfect equilibrium of an n-person bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 221-223.
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