Sequential share bargaining
This paper presents a new extension of the Rubinstein-St°ahl bargaining model to the case with n players, called sequential share bargaining. The bargaining protocol is natural and has as its main feature that the players’ shares in the cake are determined sequentially. The bargaining protocol requires unanimous agreement for proposals to be implemented. Unlike all existing bargaining protocols with unanimous agreement, the resulting game has unique subgame perfect equilibrium utilities for any value of the discount factor. In equilibrium, agreement is reached immediately. The results are therefore qualitatively the same as in the two player case. The result builds on an analysis of so-called one-dimensional bargaining problems. We show that also one-dimensional bargaining problems have unique subgame perfect equilibrium utilities for any value of the discount factor, and that also in one-dimensional bargaining problems agreement is reached immediately.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 41 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/182/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
- Imai, Haruo & Salonen, Hannu, 2000. "The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 349-365, May.
- Merlo, Antonio & Wilson, Charles A, 1995. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(2), pages 371-399, March.
- Chae, Suchan & Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1988. "The unique perfect equilibrium of an n-person bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 221-223.
- Cho, Seok-ju & Duggan, John, 2003. "Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 118-130, November.
- Seok-ju Cho & John Duggan, 2001. "Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibria in a one-Dimensional Model of Bargaining," Wallis Working Papers WP23, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Chen-Ying Huang, 2002. "Multilateral bargaining: conditional and unconditional offers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(2), pages 401-412.
- Kalandrakis, Tasos, 2004. "Equilibria in sequential bargaining games as solutions to systems of equations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 407-411, September.
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2010. "One-dimensional bargaining with Markov recognition probabilities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 189-215, January.
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2007. "One-dimensional Bargaining with Markov Recognition Probabilities," Research Memorandum 044, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Haller, Hans, 1986. "Non-cooperative bargaining of N [ges] 3 players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 11-13.
- Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
- Cardona, Daniel & Ponsati, Clara, 2007. "Bargaining one-dimensional social choices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 627-651, November.
- Suh, Sang-Chul & Wen, Quan, 2006. "Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 61-73, February.
- Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2003. "Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining and the Nash Bargaining Solution," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0306, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1992. "Another n-person bargaining game with a unique perfect equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 275-277, March.
- Vijay Krishna & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)