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Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol

  • Sang-Chul Suh

    ()

    (Department of Economics, University of Windsor)

  • Quan Wen

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University)

This paper measures the housing market impact of state-level anti-discrimination laws in the 1960s using household-level and census-tract data. State-level "fair-housing" laws attempted to bar discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin in the sale, rental, and financing of housing, and they were the direct antecedents of the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968. Their influence on the housing market outcomes of African Americans has not been assessed in previous work by economists, but policy variation across states during the 1960s provides an opportunity to pursue such estimates. During the 1960s, blacks' housing market outcomes improved relative to whites', and the proportion of exclusively white census tracts declined markedly. But I find little evidence that the fair-housing laws contributed to those changes. Rather, the bulk of the evidence indicates that the laws' effects on blacks' housing market outcomes, on residential segregation, and on the value of property in predominantly nonwhite neighborhoods were negligible.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/VUECON/vu03-w05.pdf
File Function: First version, 2003
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Paper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 0305.

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Date of creation: Feb 2003
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Handle: RePEc:van:wpaper:0305
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.vanderbilt.edu/econ/wparchive/index.html

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  1. Chen-Ying Huang, 2002. "Multilateral bargaining: conditional and unconditional offers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(2), pages 401-412.
  2. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Sang-Chul Suh & Quan Wen, 2003. "Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining and the Nash Bargaining Solution," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0306, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
  4. Asheim, Geir B., 1992. "A unique solution to n-person sequential bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 169-181, April.
  5. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  6. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
  7. Vijay Krishna & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80.
  8. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
  9. Kalyan Chatterjee & Hamid Sabourian, 1998. "Multiperson Bargaining and Strategic Complexity," CRIEFF Discussion Papers 9808, Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm.
  10. Serrano, Roberto, 1993. "Non-cooperative Implementation of the Nucleolus: The 3-Player Case," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(4), pages 345-57.
  11. Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1992. "Another n-person bargaining game with a unique perfect equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 275-277, March.
  12. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475, September.
  13. Baliga, S. & Serrano, R., 1993. "Multilateral Bargaining With Imperfect Information," Papers 193, Cambridge - Risk, Information & Quantity Signals.
  14. John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
  15. Chae, Suchan & Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1988. "The unique perfect equilibrium of an n-person bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 221-223.
  16. Haller, Hans, 1986. "Non-cooperative bargaining of N [ges] 3 players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 11-13.
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