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Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment

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  • Daniel Cardona-Coll

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Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Cardona-Coll, 2003. "Bargaining and Strategic Demand Commitment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(4), pages 357-374, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:54:y:2003:i:4:p:357-374 DOI: 10.1023/B:THEO.0000004340.74268.68
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1181-1206_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Kambe, Shinsuke, 1999. "Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 217-237, August.
    4. Chae, Suchan & Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1988. "The unique perfect equilibrium of an n-person bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 221-223.
    5. Daniel Cardona-Coll & Francisco M. Mancera, 2000. "Demand bargaining in legislatures," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 16(1), pages 163-180.
    6. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    7. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-637, May.
    8. Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993. "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 306-321, August.
    9. Asheim, Geir B., 1992. "A unique solution to n-person sequential bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, pages 169-181.
    10. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1996. "A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 134-152, April.
    11. Klaus Kultti, 1994. "An n-person bargaining game," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 130-132, Autumn.
    12. Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1992. "Another n-person bargaining game with a unique perfect equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 275-277, March.
    13. Vijay Krishna & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yves Breitmoser, 2009. "Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(2), pages 183-191, June.
    2. Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Delay in a bargaining game with contracts," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 339-353.

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