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Trade interdependence, the international financial institutions, and the recent evolution of sovereign-debt renegotiations

  • Klimenko, Mikhail M.
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.

    Volume (Year): 58 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 1 (October)
    Pages: 177-209

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:58:y:2002:i:1:p:177-209
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    1. Roberto Chang, 1993. "Private investment and sovereign debt negotiations," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 93-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    2. Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth S., 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Scholarly Articles 12491028, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    3. Goldberg, Pinelopi Koujianou & Knetter, Michael M., 1999. "Measuring the intensity of competition in export markets," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 27-60, February.
    4. Dani Rodrik, 1995. "Why is there Multilateral Lending?," NBER Working Papers 5160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Cole, Harold L & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1998. "Models of Sovereign Debt: Partial versus General Reputations," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(1), pages 55-70, February.
    6. Claessens, Stijn & Diwan, Ishac & Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo, 1992. "Recent experience with commercial bank debt reduction," Policy Research Working Paper Series 995, The World Bank.
    7. Bulow, J. & Rogoff, K., 1988. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?," Papers 411, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
    8. Raquel Fernandez & Robert W. Rosenthal, 1990. "Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(3), pages 331-349.
    9. Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, 1981. "Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(2), pages 289-309.
    10. Michael P. Dooley, 1994. "A Retrospective on the Debt Crisis," NBER Working Papers 4963, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Kenneth M. Kletzer and Brian D. Wright., 1998. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C98-100, University of California at Berkeley.
    12. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 1991. "Official credits to developing countries : implicit transfers to the banks," Policy Research Working Paper Series 592, The World Bank.
    13. Claessens, Stijn & Oks, Danel & van Wijnbergen, Sweder, 1994. "Interest Rates, Growth and External Debt: The Macroeconomic Impact of Mexico's Brady Deal," CEPR Discussion Papers 904, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1991. "Sovereign Debt Repurchases: No Cure for Overhang," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1219-1235.
    15. Gros, Daniel, 1987. "A note on the optimal tariff, retaliation and the welfare loss from tariff wars in a framework with intra-industry trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 357-367, November.
    16. Joshua Aizenman, 1988. "Trade Dependency, Bargaining and External Debt," NBER Working Papers 2726, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Vijay Krishna & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80.
    18. Maxim Engers & Jonathan Eaton, 1999. "Sanctions: Some Simple Analytics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 409-414, May.
    19. Claessens, Stijn & Diwan, Ishac, 1990. "Investment Incentives: New Money, Debt Relief, and the Critical Role of Conditionality in the Debt Crisis," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 4(1), pages 21-41, January.
    20. Wells, Robin, 1993. "Tolerance of Arrearages: How IMF Loan Policy Can Effect Debt Reduction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 621-33, June.
    21. repec:oup:qjecon:v:108:y:1993:i:4:p:967-82 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Daniel Cohen & Jeffrey Sachs, 1985. "Growth and External Debt Under Risk of Debt Repudiation," NBER Working Papers 1703, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Spiegel, M.M., 1992. ""Burden Sharing" in Sovereign Debt Reduction," Working Papers 92-41, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    24. Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Detragiache, Enrica, 1994. " The Role of Multilateral Institutions in the Market for Sovereign Debt," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(4), pages 515-29.
    25. Chae, Suchan & Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1988. "The unique perfect equilibrium of an n-person bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 221-223.
    26. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
    27. Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff & Afonso S. Bevilaqua, 1992. "Official Creditor Seniority and Burden-Sharing in the Former Soviet Bloc," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 23(1), pages 195-234.
    28. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 1994. "Interest rates, official lending, and the debt crisis: A reassessment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 263-285, August.
    29. Diwan, Ishac, 1990. "Linking trade and external debt strategies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3-4), pages 293-310, November.
    30. Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutta & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 1993. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(2), pages 463-477.
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