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Trade interdependence, the international financial institutions, and the recent evolution of sovereign-debt renegotiations

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  • Klimenko, Mikhail M.

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  • Klimenko, Mikhail M., 2002. "Trade interdependence, the international financial institutions, and the recent evolution of sovereign-debt renegotiations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 177-209, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:58:y:2002:i:1:p:177-209
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    11. Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutia & Debraj Ray & Kunal Sengupta, 2013. "A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 5, pages 97-111, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    1. Yothin Jinjarak, 2004. "On the hidden links between financing costs and international trade patterns," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 501, Econometric Society.

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