Private investment and sovereign debt negotiations
The author studies models of sovereign debt bargaining of the kind proposed by J. Bulow and K. Rogoff. All agents act rationally with perfect foresight and perfect information. The main departure from previous studies is that the government of the debtor country acts on behalf of, but is not identical to, its representative citizen. This seemingly minor change surprisingly implies that there is an indeterminacy of bargaining outcomes, including some of the sunspots type; agreement may be delayed for many periods; and marginal debt may not be worthless. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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