An n-person bargaining game
Rubinstein type bargaining is extended to n-person case with linear utilities. The game possesses a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which evelybody's share is equal as impatience goes to zero.
Volume (Year): 7 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
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