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An n-person bargaining game

  • Klaus Kultti

    (University of Helsinki, Department of Economics, Finland)

Rubinstein type bargaining is extended to n-person case with linear utilities. The game possesses a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which evelybody's share is equal as impatience goes to zero.

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Article provided by Finnish Economic Association in its journal Finnish Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 7 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Pages: 130-132

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Handle: RePEc:fep:journl:v:7:y:1994:i:2:p:130-132
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