IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Multilateral bargaining with concession costs

Listed author(s):
  • Caruana, Guillermo
  • Einav, Liran
  • Quint, Daniel

No abstract is available for this item.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-0531(05)00193-6
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 132 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 147-166

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:132:y:2007:i:1:p:147-166
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1996. "A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 134-152, April.
  2. Fershtman Chaim & Seidmann Daniel J., 1993. "Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 306-321, August.
  3. Roger Lagunoff & Akihiko Matsui, 1997. "Asynchronous Choice in Repeated Coordination Games," Game Theory and Information 9707002, EconWPA.
  4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  5. D. Abreu & F. Gul, 1998. "Bargaining and Reputation," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00s9, Economics Department, Princeton University.
  6. Ben Lockwood & Jonathan P. Thomas, 1999. "Gradualism and Irreversibility," Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics 199909, Department of Economics, University of St. Andrews.
  7. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
  8. Gale, Douglas, 1998. "Monotone Games with Positive Spillovers," Working Papers 98-34, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  9. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(4), pages 975-1000.
  10. Lipman, Barton L. & Wang, Ruqu, 2000. "Switching Costs in Frequently Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 149-190, August.
  11. Winter Eyal, 1994. "Non-cooperative Bargaining in Natural Monopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 202-220, October.
  12. Anat R. Admati & Motty Perry, 1991. "Joint Projects without Commitment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 259-276.
  13. John Sutton, 1986. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(5), pages 709-724.
  14. Lensberg, Terje, 1988. "Stability and the Nash solution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 330-341, August.
  15. Ching-to Albert Ma & Michael Manove, 1991. "Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control," Papers 0007, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
  16. Winter, Eyal, 1994. "The Demand Commitment Bargaining and Snowballing Cooperation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(2), pages 255-273, March.
  17. Leslie M. Marx & Steven A. Matthews, "undated". "Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project," Penn CARESS Working Papers 6f8dbf67d492ff8a10975496b, Penn Economics Department.
  18. Haller, Hans, 1986. "Non-cooperative bargaining of N [ges] 3 players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 11-13.
  19. Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 607-637, May.
  20. Perry Motty & Reny Philip J., 1993. "A Non-cooperative Bargaining Model with Strategically Timed Offers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 50-77, February.
  21. Saloner, Garth, 1987. "Cournot duopoly with two production periods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 183-187, June.
  22. Vijay Krishna & Roberto Serrano, 1996. "Multilateral Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 61-80.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:132:y:2007:i:1:p:147-166. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Shamier, Wendy)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.