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Economic and Regulatory Capital: What is the Difference?

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  • Repullo, Rafael
  • Elizalde, Abel

Abstract

This Paper analyses the determinants of regulatory capital (the minimum required by regulation) and economic capital (the capital that shareholders would choose in absence of regulation) in the context of the single risk factor model that underlies the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II). The results show that economic and regulatory capital do not depend on the same set of variables and do not react in the same way to changes in their common determinants. For plausible parameter values, they are both increasing in the loans? probability of default and loss given default, but variables that affect economic but not regulatory capital, such as the intermediation margin and the cost of capital, can move them significantly apart. The results also show that market discipline, proxied by the coverage of deposit insurance, increases economic capital, although the effect is generally small.

Suggested Citation

  • Repullo, Rafael & Elizalde, Abel, 2004. "Economic and Regulatory Capital: What is the Difference?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4770, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4770
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    Cited by:

    1. Marta González-Torrabadella & Josep Pijoan-Mas, 2006. "Flat tax reforms: a general equilibrium evaluation for Spain," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 30(2), pages 317-351, May.
    2. Abel Elizalde, 2006. "Credit Risk Models IV: Understanding and Pricing CDOs," Working Papers wp2006_0608, CEMFI.
    3. Jokivuolle, Esa & Peura, Samu, 2006. "Rating targeting and the confidence levels implicit in bank capital," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 27/2006, Bank of Finland.
    4. Johann Jacobs & Gary Vuuren, 2014. "A Case for Economic Capital as a Pillar 1 Regulatory Tool," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 82(2), pages 290-314, June.
    5. Nancy Masschelein, 2007. "Monitoring pro-cyclicality under the capital requirements directive : preliminary concepts for developing a framework," Working Paper Document 120, National Bank of Belgium.
    6. Aleix Calveras & Juan José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2005. "Regulation and opportunism: How much activism do we need?," Economics Working Papers 935, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    7. Juan-José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet & Beatriz Domínguez, 2009. "R& D in the Pharmaceutical Industry: A World of Small Innovations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(4), pages 539-551, April.
    8. Fonseca, Ana Rosa & González, Francisco, 2010. "How bank capital buffers vary across countries: The influence of cost of deposits, market power and bank regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 892-902, April.
    9. Jokivuolle, Esa & Peura, Samu, 2006. "Rating targeting and the confidence levels implicit in bank capital," Research Discussion Papers 27/2006, Bank of Finland.
    10. Suarez, Javier & Ceron, Jose A., 2006. "Hot and Cold Housing Markets: International Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 5411, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Repullo, Rafael & Suarez, Javier, 2008. "The Procyclical Effects of Basel II," CEPR Discussion Papers 6862, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Antonio Nicolo' & Loriana Pelizzon, 2005. "Credit Derivatives: Capital Requirements and Strategic Contracting," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0006, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    13. Greg Caldwell, 2007. "Best Instruments for Market Discipline in Banking," Staff Working Papers 07-9, Bank of Canada.
    14. Javier Diaz-Gimenez & Josep Pijoan-Mas, 2006. "Flat Tax Reforms in the U.S.: a Boon for the Income Poor," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 400, Society for Computational Economics.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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