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Multi-player Bargaining with Endogenous Capacity

Author

Listed:
  • Gabriele Camera

    (University of Iowa)

  • Cemil Selcuk

    (DePaul University)

Abstract

We study equilibrium prices and trade volume in a market with several identical buyers and a seller who commits to an inventory and then offers goods sequentially. Prices are determined by a strategic costly bargaining process with a random sequence of proponents. A unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists, characterized by no costly delays and heterogeneous sale prices. In equilibrium constraining capacity is a bargaining tactic the seller uses to improve a weak bargaining position. With capacity constraints, sale prices approach the outcome of an auction as bargaining costs vanish. The framework provides a building block for price formation in models of equilibrium search with multilateral matching, and offers a rationale for the adoption of single-unit auctions with fixed reservation price. (Copyright: Elsevier)

Suggested Citation

  • Gabriele Camera & Cemil Selcuk, 2010. "Multi-player Bargaining with Endogenous Capacity," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 13(3), pages 637-653, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:issued:08-145
    DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2009.06.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Caruana, Guillermo & Einav, Liran & Quint, Daniel, 2007. "Multilateral bargaining with concession costs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 147-166, January.
    2. Gabriele Camera & Cemil Selcuk, 2009. "Price Dispersion with Directed Search," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(6), pages 1193-1224, December.
    3. Lester, Benjamin, 2010. "Directed search with multi-vacancy firms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(6), pages 2108-2132, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Selcuk, Cemil, 2012. "Trading mechanism selection with directed search when buyers are risk averse," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 207-210.
    2. Selcuk, Cemil, 2011. "Trading mechanism selection with budget constraints," MPRA Paper 36227, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Chambolle, Claire & Christin, Clémence & Molina, Hugo, 2023. "Buyer power and exclusion: A progress report," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General

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