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Buyer Power and Exclusion: A Progress Report
[Pouvoir d'achat et exclusion : rapport d'étape]

Author

Listed:
  • Claire Chambolle

    (UMR PSAE - Paris-Saclay Applied Economics - AgroParisTech - Université Paris-Saclay - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

  • Clémence Christin

    (UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université)

  • Hugo Molina

    (UMR PSAE - Paris-Saclay Applied Economics - AgroParisTech - Université Paris-Saclay - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)

Abstract

This article presents recent advances in the analysis of buyer-seller networks, with a particular focus on the role of buyer power on exclusion. We first examine simple vertical structures and highlight that either upstream or downstream firms may have incentives to engage in exclusionary practices to either counteract or leverage buyer power. We then review current work attempting to revisit this issue in "interlocking relationships". Based on an ongoing research project, we show that the same exclusion mechanism arises when retail substitution is soft.

Suggested Citation

  • Claire Chambolle & Clémence Christin & Hugo Molina, 2023. "Buyer Power and Exclusion: A Progress Report [Pouvoir d'achat et exclusion : rapport d'étape]," Post-Print hal-03902118, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03902118
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102969
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03902118v3
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    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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