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On the game-theoretic foundations of competitive search equilibrium

  • Manolis Galenianos
  • Philipp Kircher

We provide a unified directed search framework with general production and matching specifications that encompass most of the existing literature. We prove the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure firm strategies in a finite version of the model. We use this result to derive a more complete characterization of the equilibrium set for the finite economy and to extend convergence results as the economy becomes large to general production and matching specifications. The latter extends the microfoundations for the standard market utility assumption used in competitive search models with a continuum of agents to new environments.

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File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29707/
File Function: Open access version.
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Paper provided by London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library in its series LSE Research Online Documents on Economics with number 29707.

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Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Economic Review, 2012, 53(1), pp. 1-21. ISSN: 0020-6598
Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:29707
Contact details of provider: Postal: LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.
Phone: +44 (020) 7405 7686
Web page: http://www.lse.ac.uk/

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  1. Miquel Faig & Belén Jerez, 2006. "Inflation, Prices, and Information in Competitive Search," Working Papers tecipa-215, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  2. Jacquet, Nicolas L. & Tan, Serene, 2012. "Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(3), pages 1064-1104.
  3. Ronald P. Wolthoff, 2011. "Applications and Interviews. A Structural Analysis of Two-Sided Simultaneous Search," Working Papers 2011.86, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  4. Espen R. Moen & Asa Rosen, 2007. "Incentives in competitive search equilibrium," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19663, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  5. Julien, B. & Kennes, J. & King, I., 1998. "Bidding for Labour," Discussion Papers dp98-03, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
  6. James Albrecht, Pieter Gautier, & Susan Vroman, 2003. "Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Application," Working Papers gueconwpa~03-03-02, Georgetown University, Department of Economics.
  7. Athanasios Geromichalos, 2010. "Directed Search and Optimal Production," Working Papers 1016, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  8. Christopher A. Pissarides & Barbara Petrongolo, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June.
  9. Michael Peters, 1995. "On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts," Working Papers peters-95-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  10. Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 2001. "Pricing and Matching with Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1060-1085, October.
  11. Manolis Galenianos & Philipp Kircher, 2009. "Directed search with multiple job applications," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 29702, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  12. Jan Eeckhout & Philipp Kircher, 2008. "Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-020, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  13. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
  14. Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1998. "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 6686, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Philipp Kircher, 2009. "Efficiency of Simultaneous Search," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(5), pages 861-913, October.
  16. Albrecht, James & Tan, Serene & Gautier, Pieter & Vroman, Susan, 2004. "Matching with multiple applications revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 311-314, September.
  17. Shouyong Shi, 2006. "Directed Search for Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts," Working Papers tecipa-260, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  18. Peters, Michael, 2000. "Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with Costly Search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 139-168, December.
  19. Benoît Julien & John Kennes & Ian King, 2005. "Ex post bidding and efficient coordination unemployment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(1), pages 174-193, February.
  20. Gabriele Camera & Cemil Selcuk, 2009. "Price Dispersion with Directed Search," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 7(6), pages 1193-1224, December.
  21. Peters, Michael, 2005. "Unobservable Heterogeneity in Directed Search," Microeconomics.ca working papers peters-05-06-13-01-50-30, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 16 Oct 2009.
  22. Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
  23. Ping He & Lixin Huang & Randall Wright, 2005. "Money And Banking In Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(2), pages 637-670, 05.
  24. Robert Shimer, 2005. "The Assignment of Workers to Jobs in an Economy with Coordination Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 996-1025, October.
  25. Moen, Espen R & Rosén, Åsa, 2006. "Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium and Wage Rigidity," CEPR Discussion Papers 5554, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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