IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Heterogeneous Firms in a Finite Directed Search Economy

  • Manolis Galenianos

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Penn State University)

  • Philipp Kircher

    ()

    (Department of Economics)

We consider a directed search model for a finite economy with heterogeneous firms in two informational environments. In the first, the productivity of all firms is publicly observed. We prove existence of equilibria in pure posting strategies by firms and show that wage dispersion is driven by fundamentals. That is, more productive firms post higher wages and wage dispersion is absent when firms are homogeneous. When firms have heterogeneous productivities the equilibrium is not constrained efficient. In the second environment the productivity level of each firm is private information. The main results extend to this environment: Equilibria in pure strategies exist; strategies are increasing in productivity; and constrained efficiency does not obtain. When the productivity level of all firms is drawn from the same distribution, symmetric equilibria exist and the ranking of wages equals that of productivity.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/working-papers/07-003.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania in its series PIER Working Paper Archive with number 07-003.

as
in new window

Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 03 Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pen:papers:07-003
Contact details of provider: Postal: 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104
Phone: 215-898-9992
Fax: 215-573-2378
Web page: http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/pier
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber, 1981. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 428R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  2. Michael Peters, 1998. "Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch," Working Papers peters-98-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  3. Shouyong Shi, 2002. "A Directed Search Model of Inequality with Heterogeneous Skills and Skill-Biased Technology," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(2), pages 467-491.
  4. Shi, Shouyong, 2001. "Frictional Assignment. I. Efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 232-260, June.
  5. Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 2001. "Pricing and Matching with Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(5), pages 1060-1085, October.
  6. Albrecht, James & Gautier, Pieter A. & Vroman, Susan, 2003. "Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications," IZA Discussion Papers 719, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  7. Moen, E.R., 1995. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Memorandum 37/1995, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  8. Manolis Galenianos & Philipp Kircher, 2005. "Directed Search with Multiple Job Applications," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-022, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  9. Melvyn G. Coles & Jan Eeckhout, 2000. "Heterogeneity as a coordination device," Economics Working Papers 510, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  10. Michael Peters, 1995. "On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts," Working Papers peters-95-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  11. Philip J. Reny, 2005. "On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000067, David K. Levine.
  12. Hector Chade & Lones Smith, 2005. "Simultaneous Search," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 172782000000000033, www.najecon.org.
  13. Montgomery, James D, 1991. "Equilibrium Wage Dispersion and Interindustry Wage Differentials," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(1), pages 163-79, February.
  14. Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 1999. "Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 827-49, November.
  15. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-80, January.
  16. Dale T. Mortensen & Randall Wright, 2002. "Competitive Pricing and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-20, February.
  17. Philipp Kircher, 2009. "Efficiency of Simultaneous Search," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(5), pages 861-913, October.
  18. Athey, S., 1997. "Sigle Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Working papers 97-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  19. Marja-Liisa Halko & Klaus Kultti & Juha Virrankoski, 2005. "Wage Distribution with a Two-Sided Job Auction," 2005 Meeting Papers 518, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  20. Robert Shimer, 2005. "The Assignment of Workers to Jobs in an Economy with Coordination Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 996-1025, October.
  21. Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
  22. Albrecht, James & Tan, Serene & Gautier, Pieter & Vroman, Susan, 2004. "Matching with multiple applications revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 311-314, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pen:papers:07-003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dolly Guarini)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.