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Search, Screening and Sorting

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  • Xiaoming Cai
  • Pieter A. Gautier
  • Ronald P. Wolthoff

Abstract

We investigate the effect of search frictions on labor market sorting by constructing a model which is in line with recent evidence that employers collect a pool of applicants before interviewing a subset of them. In this environment, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for sorting in applications as well as matches. We show that positive sorting is obtained when production complementarities outweigh a force against sorting measured by a quality-quantity elasticity. Interestingly, we find that the required degree of production complementarity for positive sorting is increasing in the number of interviews: it ranges from square-root-supermodularity if each firm can interview a single applicant to log-supermodularity if each firm can interview all its applicants.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaoming Cai & Pieter A. Gautier & Ronald P. Wolthoff, 2021. "Search, Screening and Sorting," CESifo Working Paper Series 9158, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9158
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Horton, John J. & Johari, Ramesh & Kircher, Philipp, 2021. "Cheap Talk Messages for Market Design: Theory and Evidence from a Labor Market with Directed," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2021033, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    sorting; complementarity; search frictions; information frictions; heterogeneity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • E24 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity

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