IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/gunwpe/0739.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

How wage announcements affect job search - a field experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Belot, Michele

    (European University Institute)

  • Kircher, Philipp

    (School of Economics, University of Edinburgh)

  • Muller, Paul

    (Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)

Abstract

We study how job seekers respond to wage announcements by assigning wages randomly to pairs of otherwise similar vacancies in a large number of professions. High wage vacancies attract more interest, in contrast with much of the evidence based on observational data. Some applicants only show interest in the low wage vacancy even when they were exposed to both. Both findings are core predictions of theories of directed/competitive search where workers trade o_ the wage with the perceived competition for the job. A calibrated model with multiple applications and on-the-job search induces magnitudes broadly in line with the empirical findings.

Suggested Citation

  • Belot, Michele & Kircher, Philipp & Muller, Paul, 2018. "How wage announcements affect job search - a field experiment," Working Papers in Economics 739, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0739
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/57526
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gomes, Pedro, 2012. "Labour market flows: Facts from the United Kingdom," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 165-175.
    2. Ernesto Dal Bó & Frederico Finan & Martín A. Rossi, 2013. "Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 128(3), pages 1169-1218.
    3. Marinescu, Ioana, 2017. "The general equilibrium impacts of unemployment insurance: Evidence from a large online job board," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 14-29.
    4. Michèle Belot & Philipp Kircher & Paul Muller, 2019. "Providing Advice to Jobseekers at Low Cost: An Experimental Study on Online Advice," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 86(4), pages 1411-1447.
    5. Galenianos, Manolis & Kircher, Philipp, 2009. "Directed search with multiple job applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 445-471, March.
    6. David Neumark & Roy J. Bank & Kyle D. Van Nort, 1996. "Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 111(3), pages 915-941.
    7. Dale T. Mortensen & Randall Wright, 2002. "Competitive Pricing and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-20, February.
    8. J. J. McCall, 1970. "Economics of Information and Job Search," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(1), pages 113-126.
    9. Alexandre Mas & Amanda Pallais, 2017. "Valuing Alternative Work Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(12), pages 3722-3759, December.
    10. Susan Vroman, 2015. "Directed Search with Phantom Vacancies," 2015 Meeting Papers 649, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    11. Randall Wright & Philipp Kircher & Benoit Julîen & Veronica Guerrieri, 2017. "Directed Search: A Guided Tour," NBER Working Papers 23884, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Ioana Marinescu & Ronald Wolthoff, 2020. "Opening the Black Box of the Matching Function: The Power of Words," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 535-568.
    13. Joanna N. Lahey, 2008. "Age, Women, and Hiring: An Experimental Study," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 43(1).
    14. Guido Menzio & Shouyong Shi, 2011. "Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 119(3), pages 468-510.
    15. Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2002. "Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker and Employer Heterogeneity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2295-2350, November.
    16. Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald, 2015. "Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 1-15.
    17. James Albrecht & Pieter A. Gautier & Susan Vroman, 2006. "Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(4), pages 869-891.
    18. Ayres, Ian & Siegelman, Peter, 1995. "Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 304-321, June.
    19. Michael Peters, 1997. "On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The Case of Complete Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 241-264.
    20. Andreas Leibbrandt & John A. List, 2015. "Do Women Avoid Salary Negotiations? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(9), pages 2016-2024, September.
    21. Petit, Pascale, 2007. "The effects of age and family constraints on gender hiring discrimination: A field experiment in the French financial sector," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 371-391, June.
    22. Stefano Banfi & Benjamín Villena-Roldán, 2019. "Do High-Wage Jobs Attract More Applicants? Directed Search Evidence from the Online Labor Market," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(3), pages 715-746.
    23. Harry J. Holzer & Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, 1991. "Job Queues and Wages," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 106(3), pages 739-768.
    24. Ernst Fehr & Lorenz Goette, 2007. "Do Workers Work More if Wages Are High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 298-317, March.
    25. Arnaud Cheron & Bruno Decreuse, 2017. "Matching with Phantoms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 1041-1070.
    26. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004. "Are Emily and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 991-1013, September.
    27. Shi, Shouyong, 2001. "Frictional Assignment. I. Efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 232-260, June.
    28. Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
    29. Faberman, R. Jason & Menzio, Guido, 2018. "Evidence on the relationship between recruiting and the starting wage," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 67-79.
    30. Moen, Espen R, 1997. "Competitive Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(2), pages 385-411, April.
    31. Ioana Marinescu & Roland Rathelot, 2018. "Mismatch Unemployment and the Geography of Job Search," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 42-70, July.
    32. Kory Kroft & Fabian Lange & Matthew J. Notowidigdo, 2013. "Duration Dependence and Labor Market Conditions: Evidence from a Field Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 128(3), pages 1123-1167.
    33. Espen R Moen & Rasmus Lentz, 2017. "Competitive or Random Search?," 2017 Meeting Papers 1128, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    34. Dan-Olof Rooth, 2009. "Obesity, Attractiveness, and Differential Treatment in Hiring: A Field Experiment," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 44(3).
    35. Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2002. "Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker and Employer Heterogeneity," Post-Print hal-03458567, HAL.
    36. Philipp Kircher, 2009. "Efficiency of Simultaneous Search," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(5), pages 861-913, October.
    37. Acemoglu, Daron & Shimer, Robert, 1999. "Holdups and Efficiency with Search Frictions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 827-849, November.
    38. Burdett, Kenneth & Mortensen, Dale T, 1998. "Wage Differentials, Employer Size, and Unemployment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 257-273, May.
    39. Jessica Goldberg, 2016. "Kwacha Gonna Do? Experimental Evidence about Labor Supply in Rural Malawi," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 129-149, January.
    40. Andreas Hornstein & Per Krusell & Giovanni L. Violante, 2011. "Frictional Wage Dispersion in Search Models: A Quantitative Assessment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(7), pages 2873-2898, December.
    41. Peters, Michael, 1991. "Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(5), pages 1425-1454, September.
    42. Fabien Postel-Vinay & Jean-Marc Robin, 2002. "Equilibrium wage dispersion with worker and employer heterogeneity," Post-Print hal-03587660, HAL.
    43. Ronald Wolthoff, 2014. "It'S About Time: Implications Of The Period Length In An Equilibrium Search Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 55, pages 839-867, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Haaland, Ingar & Roth, Christopher & Wohlfart. Johannes, 2020. "Designing Information Provision Experiments," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1275, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    2. Andrea Gerali & Elisa Guglielminetti & Danilo Liberati, 2021. "(In)efficient Separations, Firing Costs and Temporary Contracts," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1330, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    3. Peter J. Kuhn & Kailing Shen, 2021. "What Happens When Employers Can No Longer Discriminate in Job Ads?," NBER Working Papers 29116, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos & Gartner, Hermann & Leo, Kaas, 2020. "Recruitment Policies, Job-Filling Rates and Matching Efficiency," IAB-Discussion Paper 202015, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
    5. Delfino, Alexia, 2021. "Breaking Gender Barriers: Experimental Evidence on Men in Pink-Collar Jobs," IZA Discussion Papers 14083, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Braun, Christine & Engelhardt, Bryan & Griffy, Benjamin & Rupert, Peter, 2020. "Testing the independence of job arrival rates and wage offers," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    7. Victor Alfonso Naya & Guillaume Bied & Philippe Caillou & Bruno Crépon & Christophe Gaillac & Elia Pérennes & Michèle Sebag, 2021. "Designing labor market recommender systems: the importance of job seeker preferences and competition," Post-Print hal-03540319, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Philipp Kircher & Paul Muller & Michele Belot, 2017. "How Wage Announcements Affect Job Search Behaviour - A Field Experimental Investigation," 2017 Meeting Papers 722, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Leo Kaas & Philipp Kircher, 2015. "Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(10), pages 3030-3060, October.
    3. Mangin, Sephorah, 2017. "A theory of production, matching, and distribution," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 172(C), pages 376-409.
    4. Albrecht, James & Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter & Vroman, Susan, 2020. "Multiple applications, competing mechanisms, and market power," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    5. Ioana Marinescu & Ronald Wolthoff, 2020. "Opening the Black Box of the Matching Function: The Power of Words," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 535-568.
    6. Shouyong Shi, 2009. "Directed Search for Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(2), pages 561-584, March.
    7. Gautier, Pieter A. & Moraga-González, José L. & Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2016. "Search costs and efficiency: Do unemployed workers search enough?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 123-139.
    8. R. Jason Faberman & Andreas I. Mueller & Ayşegül Şahin & Giorgio Topa, 2022. "Job Search Behavior Among the Employed and Non‐Employed," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 90(4), pages 1743-1779, July.
    9. Galenianos, Manolis & Kircher, Philipp, 2009. "Directed search with multiple job applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 445-471, March.
    10. Philipp Kircher, 2009. "Efficiency of Simultaneous Search," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(5), pages 861-913, October.
    11. Ronald Wolthoff, 2018. "Applications and Interviews: Firms’ Recruiting Decisions in a Frictional Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 85(2), pages 1314-1351.
    12. Wolthoff, Ronald P., 2011. "It's About Time: Implications of the Period Length in an Equilibrium Job Search Model," IZA Discussion Papers 6002, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    13. Menzio, Guido & Shi, Shouyong, 2010. "Block recursive equilibria for stochastic models of search on the job," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(4), pages 1453-1494, July.
    14. Andreas Kettemann & Andreas I. Mueller & Josef Zweimüller, 2018. "Vacancy durations and entry wages: evidence from linked vacancy-employer-employee data," ECON - Working Papers 312, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    15. Ronald Wolthoff, 2010. "Applications and Interviews: A Structural Analysis of Two-Sided Simultaneous Search," 2010 Meeting Papers 114, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Jan Eeckhout & Philipp Kircher, 2010. "Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 539-574, March.
    17. Eeckhout, Jan & Kircher, Philipp, 2010. "Sorting versus screening: Search frictions and competing mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(4), pages 1354-1385, July.
    18. Stefano Banfi & Benjamín Villena-Roldán, 2019. "Do High-Wage Jobs Attract More Applicants? Directed Search Evidence from the Online Labor Market," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(3), pages 715-746.
    19. Guillaume Wilemme, 2021. "Optimal Taxation to Correct Job Mismatching," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 40, pages 170-197, April.
    20. Rogerson, Richard & Shimer, Robert, 2011. "Search in Macroeconomic Models of the Labor Market," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 7, pages Pages: 61, Elsevier.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    online job search; directed search; wage competition; field experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0739. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/naiguse.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ann-Christin Räätäri Nyström (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/naiguse.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.