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Directed Search With Phantom Vacancies

Author

Listed:
  • James Albrecht

    (GU - Georgetown University [Washington])

  • Bruno Decreuse

    (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Susan Vroman

    (GU - Georgetown University [Washington])

Abstract

When vacancies are filled, the job ads often remain, creating phantom vacancies. Older listings more likely represent phantoms. We assume job seekers direct their search based on listing age. Forming a match with an age‐ a vacancy creates an age‐ a phantom with probability β and generates an externality affecting vacancies aged a and older. Thus, the externality decreases with the match's listing age. Relative to efficient behavior, job seekers overapply to younger listings. We calibrate using U.S. data. The contribution of phantoms to inefficiency is large, but, given their existence, the planner cannot improve much on the directed search allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • James Albrecht & Bruno Decreuse & Susan Vroman, 2022. "Directed Search With Phantom Vacancies," Post-Print hal-04454024, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04454024
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12615
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Galenianos, Manolis & Kircher, Philipp, 2009. "Directed search with multiple job applications," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 445-471, March.
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    9. Sushant Acharya & Shu Lin Wee, 2018. "Replacement Hiring," 2018 Meeting Papers 758, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Albrecht, James & Navarro, Lucas & Vroman, Susan, 2010. "Efficiency in a search and matching model with endogenous participation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 48-50, January.
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    13. Stefano Banfi & Benjamín Villena-Roldán, 2019. "Do High-Wage Jobs Attract More Applicants? Directed Search Evidence from the Online Labor Market," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(3), pages 715-746.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Directed Search with Phantom Vacancies
      by Christian Zimmermann in NEP-DGE blog on 2017-04-18 20:10:17

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    Cited by:

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    2. Gökten, Meryem & Heimberger, Philipp & Lichtenberger, Andreas, 2024. "How far from full employment? The European unemployment problem revisited," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 164(C).
    3. Fatih Karahan & Kurt Mitman & Brendan Moore, 2019. "Micro and Macro Effects of UI Policies: Evidence from Missouri," Staff Reports 905, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    4. Bhole, Monica & Fradkin, Andrey & Horton, John, 2021. "Information About Vacancy Competition Redirects Job Search," SocArXiv p82fk, Center for Open Science.
    5. Stef Garasto & Jyldyz Djumalieva & Karlis Kanders & Rachel Wilcock & Cath Sleeman, 2021. "Developing experimental estimates of regional skill demand," Economic Statistics Centre of Excellence (ESCoE) Discussion Papers ESCoE DP-2021-02, Economic Statistics Centre of Excellence (ESCoE).
    6. Michèle Belot & Philipp Kircher & Paul Muller, 2022. "How Wage Announcements Affect Job Search—A Field Experiment," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 1-67, October.
    7. Carter, Charles & Delaney, Judith M. & Papps, Kerry L., 2024. "The Effect of Wages on Job Vacancy Duration: Evidence from a Spatial Discontinuity," IZA Discussion Papers 17273, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    8. He, Chuan & Mau, Karsten & Xu, Mingzhi, 2021. "Trade Shocks and Firms Hiring Decisions: Evidence from Vacancy Postings of Chinese Firms in the Trade War," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    9. Ehrenfried, Felix & Holzner, Christian, 2019. "Dynamics and endogeneity of firms’ recruitment behaviour," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 63-84.
    10. Altmann, Steffen & Glenny, Anita Marie & Mahlstedt, Robert & Sebald, Alexander, 2022. "The Direct and Indirect Effects of Online Job Search Advice," IZA Discussion Papers 15830, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Karahan, Fatih & Mitman, Kurt & Moore, Brendan, 2019. "Individual and Market-Level Effects of UI Policies: Evidence from Missouri," IZA Discussion Papers 12805, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    12. Stefano Banfi & Benjamin Villena-Roldan & Sekyu Choi, 2018. "Deconstructing job search behavior," 2018 Meeting Papers 368, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    13. Ciao-Wei Chen & Laura Yue Li, 2023. "Is hiring fast a good sign? The informativeness of job vacancy duration for future firm profitability," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 1316-1353, September.
    14. Sushant Acharya & Shu Lin Wee, 2018. "Replacement Hiring," 2018 Meeting Papers 758, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    15. Acharya, Sushant & Wee, Shu Lin, 2020. "On-the-job Search and the Productivity-Wage Gap," CEPR Discussion Papers 14430, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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