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On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts

  • Michael Peters

    (Department of Economics, University of Toronto)

This paper explores two models of an economy in which contracts are exchanged. In the first version contracts are exchanged on a competitive market in which traders expectations concerning conditions that prevail within specific markets adjust until markets `clear'. In the second model contract designers compete directly against one another by offering alternate contracts. It is shown that the two models are equivalent in the sense that an allocation is supported by some equilibrium in one model if and only if there is an economy in which the allocation is supported by equilibrium in the other.

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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series GE, Growth, Math methods with number 9507001.

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Date of creation: 11 Jul 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpge:9507001
Note: PS 38pp, 2 fig files, one page each JEL Classification: A1
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  1. Gale, Douglas, 1996. "Equilibria and Pareto Optima of Markets with Adverse Selection," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 207-35, February.
  2. Peck, James, 1996. "Competition in Transactions Mechanisms: The Emergence of Price Competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 109-123, September.
  3. Carlton, Dennis W, 1978. "Market Behavior with Demand Uncertainty and Price Inflexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 571-87, September.
  4. Holzer, Harry J & Katz, Lawrence F & Krueger, Alan B, 1991. "Job Queues and Wages," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(3), pages 739-68, August.
  5. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
  6. Dale Mortensen, 1984. "Job Search and Labor Market Analysis," Discussion Papers 594, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  7. Gale, Douglas, 1992. "A Walrasian Theory of Markets with Adverse Selection," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 229-55, April.
  8. Wilson, Robert B, 1989. "Efficient and Competitive Rationing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, January.
  9. Peters Michael, 1994. "Equilibrium Mechanisms in a Decentralized Market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 390-423, December.
  10. Stephen Nickell & D. Nicolitsas, 1994. "Wages," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 51644, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  11. Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
  12. Michael Peters, 1995. "A Competitive Distribution of Auctions," Working Papers peters-95-03, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  13. Hahn, Frank, 1978. "On Non-Walrasian Equilibria," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 1-17, February.
  14. Ehud Kalai & Ehud Lehrer, 1993. "Subjective Games and Equilibria: I+," Discussion Papers 1077, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  15. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "Factor Market Search and the Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 325-55, April.
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