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A Queuing Model of the Market for Access to Trading Partners

  • Michael Sattinger

    (University at Albany, State University of New York, U.S.A.)

In this article, a market for access to trading partners arises through the operation of a competitive market in which consumers queue for goods at firms. Equilibrium occurs when firms and buyers face the same trade-off between price and wait time. The trade-off measures the cost to firms of more customers and the cost to customers of a shorter expected wait time. The queuing model is related to mechanisms that ration goods among potential buyers and to models in which the good is characterized by price and by a second variable reflecting likelihood of or delay in transaction. Copyright Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association

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Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 43 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 533-548

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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:43:y:2002:i:2:p:533-548
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