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Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners

In: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining

Author

Listed:
  • Kalyan Chatterjee

    (The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802, USA)

  • Bhaskar Dutta

    (Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Centre, 7, S.J.S. Sansanwal Marg, New Delhi, 110 016, India)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect of competition for bargaining partners on the prices that prevail in thin markets. as well as how the matches are simultaneously determined. Three trading processes or bargaining procedures are described. In all the variants that we consider, except for one case of public offers, either there is no pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium or such equilibria exhibit delay in reaching agreement.

Suggested Citation

  • Kalyan Chatterjee & Bhaskar Dutta, 2013. "Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 3, pages 51-77, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789814447577_0003
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    Cited by:

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    2. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2012. "Transparency, complementarity and holdout," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 598-612.
    3. Michael Sattinger, 2003. "Price Dynamics and the Market for Access to Trading Partners," Discussion Papers 03-10, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
    4. Kalyan Chatterjee & Kaustav Das, 2015. "Decentralised bilateral trading, competition for bargaining partners and the “law of one price”," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 949-991, November.
    5. Calvo-Armengol, Antoni, 2003. "A decentralized market with trading links," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 83-103, February.
    6. Matteo M. Galizzi, 2009. "Bargaining and Networks in a Gas Bilateral Oligopoly," Working Papers 0906, University of Brescia, Department of Economics.
    7. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Dutta, Bhaskar, "undated". "Markets with Bilateral Bargaining and Incomplete Information," Economic Research Papers 269732, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    8. Sreeparna Saha & Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Jaideep Roy & Grazyna Wiejak-Roy, 2021. "Institutional Imperfections and Buyer-Induced Holdout in Land Acquisition," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 177(3), pages 261-298.
    9. Matteo Maria GALIZZI, 2006. "Gas thin markets:insights from bargaining and networks models," Departmental Working Papers 2006-12, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    10. Li, Duozhe, 2010. "A multilateral telephone bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 43-45, July.
    11. Michiel Leur, 2018. "Information and Efficiency in Thin Buyer–Seller Markets over Random Networks," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 51(4), pages 1069-1095, April.
    12. Thomas, Charles J., 2018. "An alternating-offers model of multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 269-293.
    13. Michael Sattinger, 2002. "A Queuing Model of the Market for Access to Trading Partners," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(2), pages 533-548, May.
    14. Gary E. Bolton & Kalyan Chatterjee & Kathleen L. McGinn, 2013. "How Communication Links Influence Coalition Bargaining: A Laboratory Investigation," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market Selected Papers on Bilateral and Multilateral Bargaining, chapter 6, pages 113-128, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    15. Corominas-Bosch, Margarida, 2004. "Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 35-77, March.
    16. Kalyan Chatterjee & Kaustav Das, 2013. "Decentralised Bilateral Trading in a Market with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 1313, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
    17. Charness, Gary & Corominas-Bosch, Margarida & Frechette, Guillaume R., 2007. "Bargaining and network structure: An experiment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 28-65, September.
    18. Chatterjee, Kalyan & Das, Kaustav, 2017. "Bilateral trading and incomplete information: Price convergence in a small market," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 89-113.
    19. Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2008. "Multi-person Bargaining With Complementarity: Is There Holdout?," MPRA Paper 11517, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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