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Competition Among Auctioneers

Author

Listed:
  • Ángel Hernando Veciana

    (Universidad de Alicante)

Abstract

In this paper, we analyse a multistage game of competition among auctioneers. In a first stage, auctioneers commit to some publicly announced reserve prices, and in a second stage, bidders choose to participate in one of the auctions. We prove existence of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies for the whole game. We also show that one property of the equilibrium set is that when the numbers of auctioneers and bidders tend to infinity, almost all auctioneers with production cost low enough to trade announce a reserve price equal to their production costs. Our paper confirms previous results for some "limit" versions of the model by McAfee [9], Peters [13], and Peters and Severinov [18].

Suggested Citation

  • Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2001. "Competition Among Auctioneers," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2001-18
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Peters, 1999. "Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(3), pages 273-292.
    2. Michael Peters, 2001. "Surplus Extraction and Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(3), pages 613-631.
    3. Michael Peters, 1997. "A Competitive Distribution of Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(1), pages 97-123.
    4. Peters, Michael, 2000. "Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with Costly Search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 139-168, December.
    5. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
    6. Burguet, Roberto & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1999. "Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(1), pages 231-247, February.
    7. Mark A. Satterthwaite & Steven R. Williams, 1989. "The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 56(4), pages 477-498.
    8. Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1985. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 619-632, November.
    9. Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 1997. "Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 141-179, July.
    10. Peters, Michael, 1984. "Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(5), pages 1117-1127, September.
    11. Beth Allen & Martin Hellwig, 1986. "Bertrand-Edgeworth Oligopoly in Large Markets," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(2), pages 175-204.
    12. Michael Peters, 1997. "On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The Case of Complete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(2), pages 241-264.
    13. Kenneth Burdett & Shouyong Shi & Randall Wright, 1998. "Pricing with frictions," Working Papers 98-9, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    14. Steven R. Williams, 1991. "Existence and Convergence of Equilibria in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 58(2), pages 351-374.
    15. Michael Peters, 1995. "On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts," GE, Growth, Math methods 9507001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Epstein, Larry G. & Peters, Michael, 1999. "A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 119-160, September.
    17. Steven A. Matthews, 1995. "A Technical Primer on Auction Theory I: Independent Private Values," Discussion Papers 1096, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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    Cited by:

    1. Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2006. "Internet auctions with many traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 220-245, September.

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