Angel Hernando-Veciana

Personal Details

First Name:	Angel
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Hernando-Veciana
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	phe119
	[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
	https://sites.google.com/view/angelhernandoveciana
	Departamento de Economia Universidad Carlos III c/ Madrid, 126 28903 Getafe (Madrid) Spain
Terminal Degree:	2000 Department of Economics; University College London (UCL) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Departamento de Economía
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Madrid, Spain
http://www.eco.uc3m.es/
RePEc:edi:deuc3es (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2014. "On the Optimality of Not Allocating," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp514, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
   • Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2014. "On the optimality of not allocating," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 233-235.

   Cited by:

   1. Goeree, Jacob K. & Kushnir, Alexey, 2016. "Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 250-256.

2. Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2013. "Do Not Panic: How to Avoid Inefficient Rushes Using Multi-Stage Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp489, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.

   Cited by:

   1. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2014. "On the optimality of not allocating," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 233-235.
      • Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2014. "On the Optimality of Not Allocating," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp514, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.

3. Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2011. "Persistent markups in bidding markets with financial constraints," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1133, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

   Cited by:

   1. Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Angel, "undated". "Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints," Economic Research Papers 270532, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
      • Beker, Pablo & Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2013. "Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1017, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
   2. Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2015. "The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 234-261.

4. Ángel Hernando Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2008. "Second Best Efficiency in Auctions," Working Papers. Serie AD 2008-17, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

   Cited by:

   1. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2011. "Second best efficiency and the English auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 496-506.
   2. Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2018. "Inefficient rushes in auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
   3. Alfonso Rosa García & Hubert Janos Kiss & Ismael Rodríguez Lara, 2009. "Do social networks prevent bank runs?," Working Papers. Serie AD 2009-25, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
      • Hubert Janos Kiss & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara & Alfonso Rosa-Garcia, 2012. "Do Social Networks Prevent Bank Runs?," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0812, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
      • Garcia-Rosa, Alfonso & Kiss, Hubert Janos & Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael, 2010. "Do Social Networks Prevent Bank Runs?," UMUFAE Economics Working Papers 9723, DIGITUM. Universidad de Murcia.
   4. Charles A. Holt & William Shobe & Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer & Jacob K. Goeree, 2007. "Auction Design for Selling CO2 Emission Allowances Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative," Reports 2007-03, Center for Economic and Policy Studies.

5. Börgers, Tilman & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Krähmer, Daniel, 2007. "When are signals complements or substitutes?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we072111, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
   • Börgers, Tilman & Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013. "When are signals complements or substitutes?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 165-195.
   • Börgers, Tilman & Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Krähmer, Daniel, 2010. "When are Signals Complements or Substitutes?," MPRA Paper 29124, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Tilman Borgers & Angel Hernanco-Veciana & Daniel Krohmer, 2010. "When are Signals Complements or Substitutes," Discussion Papers 1488, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

   Cited by:

   1. Sahuguet, Nicolas & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2021. "The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 15625, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2023. "The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 61(1), pages 141-185, March.
   2. James Andreoni & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2012. "Diverging Opinions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 209-232, February.
   3. Kambhampati, Ashwin & Segura-Rodriguez, Carlos & Shao, Peng, 2024. "Why informationally diverse teams need not form, even when efficient," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).
   4. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2021. "Learning Efficiency of Multi-Agent Information Structures," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2299R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2021.
      • Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2021. "Learning Efficiency of Multi-Agent Information Structures," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2299, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
      • Frick, Mira & Iijima, Ryota & Ishii, Yuhta, 2022. "Learning Efficiency of Multi-Agent Information Structures," CEPR Discussion Papers 16877, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   5. Federico Vaccari, 2024. "Belief patterns with information processing," Papers 2411.17597, arXiv.org.
   6. Kaya, Ayça & Vereshchagina, Galina, 2022. "Sorting expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
   7. Chade, Hector & Eeckhout, Jan, 2018. "Matching information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
      • Jan Eeckhout, 2012. "Matching Information," 2012 Meeting Papers 835, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   8. Deniz Kattwinkel & Axel Niemeyer & Justus Preusser & Alexander Winter, 2022. "Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents," Papers 2205.10910, arXiv.org.
   9. Mark Whitmeyer & Cole Williams, 2024. "Dynamic Signals," Papers 2407.16648, arXiv.org.
   10. Peter Achim & Roland Strausz, 2025. "Oligopolistic Information Markets," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 554, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
   11. Ay, Jean-Sauveur & Le Gallo, Julie, 2021. "The Signaling Values of Nested Wine Names," Working Papers 321851, American Association of Wine Economists.
       • Jean-Sauveur Ay & Julie Le Gallo, 2021. "The signaling value of nested wine names," Post-Print hal-03268014, HAL.
   12. Dirk Bergemann & Marco Ottaviani, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2296, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
       • Bergemann, Dirk & Ottaviani, Marco, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," CEPR Discussion Papers 16459, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   13. ,, 2014. "On the relationship between individual and group decisions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
   14. Jan Knoepfle, 2024. "Dynamic Competition for Attention," Papers 2409.18595, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
   15. Kailin Chen, 2025. "Ranking Statistical Experiments via the Linear Convex Order and the Lorenz Zonoid: Economic Applications," Papers 2502.06530, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2026.
   16. Caio Machado & Ana Elisa Pereira, 2023. "Optimal Capital Structure with Stock Market Feedback," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(4), pages 1329-1371.
   17. Strausz, Roland, 2022. "Correlation-Savvy Sellers," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 347, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
       • Roland Strausz, 2024. "Correlation‐savvy sellers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 55(2), pages 266-291, June.
       • Roland Strausz, 2023. "Correlation-Savvy Sellers," Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers 0016, Berlin School of Economics.
   18. Lu Hong & Scott E. Page, 2025. "The range of collective accuracy for binary classifications under majority rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 79(1), pages 275-300, February.
   19. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Access fees for competing lobbies," Working Papers IES 2014/22, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2014.
   20. Ichihashi, Shota, 2021. "The economics of data externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
   21. Joel Sobel, 2014. "On the relationship between individual and group decisions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000950, David K. Levine.
   22. Deniz Kattwinkel & Axel Niemeyer & Justus Preusser & Alexander Winter, 2023. "Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_485, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

6. Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2006. "Information Acquisition In Auctions: Sealed Bids Vs. Open Bids," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
   • Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2009. "Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 372-405, March.

   Cited by:

   1. Ángel Hernando Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider'S Curse," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
      • Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Tröge, Michael, 2011. "The insider's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 339-350, March.
      • Angel Hernando-Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider's Curse," Microeconomics 0503012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   2. Tri Vi Dang & Florian Morath, 2013. "The Taxation of Bilateral Trade with Endogenous Information," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2013-07, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
      • Tri Vi Dang & Florian Morath, 2015. "The Taxation of Bilateral Trade with Endogenous Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 5157, CESifo.
   3. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
   4. Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch & Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2020. "Projection of Private Values in Auctions," CSEF Working Papers 571, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
      • Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch & Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2021. "Projection of Private Values in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(10), pages 3256-3298, October.
   5. Tian, Guoqiang & Xiao, Mingjun, 2007. "Endogenous Information Acquisition on Opponents' Valuations in Multidimensional First Price Auctions," MPRA Paper 41214, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2010.
   6. Florian Morath, 2013. "Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 99-131, June.
      • Florian Morath, 2011. "Volunteering and the Strategic Value of Ignorance," Working Papers volunteering_and_the_stra, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
      • Morath, Florian, 2010. "Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2010-17, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
      • Florian Morath, 2011. "Volunteering and the Strategic Value of Ignorance," CESifo Working Paper Series 3419, CESifo.
   7. Florian Morath & Johannes Münster, 2013. "Information acquisition in conflicts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(1), pages 99-129, September.
      • Morath, Florian & Münster, Johannes, 2010. "Information acquisition in conflicts," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 314, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
      • Morath, Florian & Münster, Johannes, 2009. "Information acquisition in conflicts [Informationsbeschaffung in Konflikten]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2009-10, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
   8. Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu, 2015. "Delegation and Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 524, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   9. Daniel Quint, 2010. "Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(3), pages 469-490, September.
   10. Vitali Gretschko & Alexander Rajko, 2015. "Excess information acquisition in auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(3), pages 335-355, September.
   11. Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2025. "Know thy enemy: Information acquisition in contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).

7. Ángel Hernando Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider'S Curse," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
   • Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Tröge, Michael, 2011. "The insider's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 339-350, March.
   • Angel Hernando-Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider's Curse," Microeconomics 0503012, University Library of Munich, Germany.

   Cited by:

   1. Boone, J. & Goeree, J.K., 2005. "Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions," Discussion Paper 2005-72, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
      • Boone, J. & Goeree, J.K., 2005. "Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions," Discussion Paper 2005-021, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
      • Jan Boone & JacobK. Goeree, 2009. "Optimal Privatisation Using Qualifying Auctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 277-297, January.
      • Boone, J. & Goeree, J.K., 2005. "Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions," Other publications TiSEM 7453bfe2-a72b-43dd-b594-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Boone, J. & Goeree, J.K., 2005. "Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions," Other publications TiSEM 679149b1-cd8e-4728-9a44-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Boone, Jan & Goeree, Jacob K., 2005. "Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5118, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   2. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2009. "Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 372-405, March.
      • Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2006. "Information Acquisition In Auctions: Sealed Bids Vs. Open Bids," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
   3. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 167(1), pages 113-132.
      • Laurent Lamy, 2007. "The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders," Working Papers 2007-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
      • Laurent Lamy, 2012. "The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Post-Print halshs-00754606, HAL.
      • Laurent Lamy, 2012. "The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754606, HAL.
      • Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE Working Papers halshs-00586039, HAL.
      • Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Working Papers halshs-00586039, HAL.
   4. Alejandro Francetich, 2013. "Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner’s Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms," Working Papers 501, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
   5. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
   6. Jan Boone & Roy Chen & Jacob Goeree & Angelo Polydoro, 2009. "Risky procurement with an insider bidder," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(4), pages 417-436, December.
   7. Florian Morath, 2013. "Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 99-131, June.
      • Florian Morath, 2011. "Volunteering and the Strategic Value of Ignorance," Working Papers volunteering_and_the_stra, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
      • Morath, Florian, 2010. "Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2010-17, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
      • Florian Morath, 2011. "Volunteering and the Strategic Value of Ignorance," CESifo Working Paper Series 3419, CESifo.
   8. Gregory Pavlov, 2013. "Correlated Equilibria and Communication Equilibria in All-pay Auctions," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20132, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
      • Gregory Pavlov, 2025. "Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 29(3), pages 479-511, September.

8. Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2001. "Competition Among Auctioneers," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

   Cited by:

   1. Peters,M. & Severinov,S., 2001. "Internet auctions with many traders," Working papers 11, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
      • Michael Peters & Sergei Severinov, 2001. "Internet Auctions with Many Traders," Working Papers peters-01-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
      • Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2006. "Internet auctions with many traders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 220-245, September.
      • Peters, Michael & Severinov, Sergei, 2005. "Internet Auctions with Many Traders," Microeconomics.ca working papers peters-05-03-30-03-06-03, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 23 Jan 2006.

9. Angel Hernando-Veciana, 2000. "Successful Uninformed Bidding," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0791, Econometric Society.
   • Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2004. "Successful uninformed bidding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 29-53, July.
   • Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2001. "Successful Uninformed Bidding," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

   Cited by:

   1. Jan Boone & Jacob K. Goeree, 2009. "Optimal Privatisation Using Qualifying Auctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 277-297, January.
   2. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2009. "Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 372-405, March.
      • Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2006. "Information Acquisition In Auctions: Sealed Bids Vs. Open Bids," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
   3. Boone, Jan & Goeree, Jacob K., 2005. "Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 5118, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
      • Boone, J. & Goeree, J.K., 2005. "Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions," Discussion Paper 2005-021, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
      • Jan Boone & JacobK. Goeree, 2009. "Optimal Privatisation Using Qualifying Auctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 277-297, January.
      • Boone, J. & Goeree, J.K., 2005. "Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions," Other publications TiSEM 7453bfe2-a72b-43dd-b594-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Boone, J. & Goeree, J.K., 2005. "Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions," Other publications TiSEM 679149b1-cd8e-4728-9a44-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Boone, J. & Goeree, J.K., 2005. "Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions," Discussion Paper 2005-72, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
   4. Larson, Nathan, 2009. "Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 430-460, March.
   5. Arup Daripa, 2005. "Informational Free Rides in Uniform Price Auctions: Exception or Norm?," Microeconomics 0511007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Arup Daripa, 2005. "Informational Free Rides in Uniform Price Auctions: Exception or Norm?," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0521, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.

10. Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Angel, "undated". "Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints," Economic Research Papers 270532, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    • Beker, Pablo & Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2013. "Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1017, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Angel, "undated". "Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints," Economic Research Papers 270532, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
       • Beker, Pablo & Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2013. "Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1017, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.

Articles

1. Hagen, Martin & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2021. "Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).

   Cited by:

   1. Hagen, Martin, 2023. "Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 281-298.

2. Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2018. "Inefficient rushes in auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.

   Cited by:

   1. Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2021. "I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions," Papers 2104.09942, arXiv.org.
      • Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2023. "I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions," Post-Print hal-04099021, HAL.
      • Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2020. "I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions," AMSE Working Papers 2044, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
      • Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2020. "I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions," Working Papers halshs-03078811, HAL.
      • Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2023. "I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(4), pages 1329-1362, November.
      • Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Tsodikovich, Yevgeny & Viossat, Yannick, 2023. "I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118706, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
   2. Wang, Dazhong & Xu, Xinyi, 2022. "Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
   3. Gonçalves, Ricardo & Ray, Indrajit, 2017. "Partition Equilibria in a Japanese-English Auction with Discrete Bid Levels for the Wallet Game," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 34, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
   4. Fabio Michelucci, 2022. "Promoting Entry and Efficiency via Reserve Prices," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-7, June.
   5. Niklas Klarnskou & Philippos Louis & Wouter Passtoors, 2024. "Feedback and Competition in Procurement e-Auctions," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 04-2024, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
   6. Ricardo Gonçalves & Indrajit Ray, 2024. "Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 28(1), pages 125-150, February.

3. Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2015. "The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 234-261.

   Cited by:

   1. Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2018. "Efficient Ascending Menu Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 18/09, Department of Economics, University of York.

4. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2014. "On the optimality of not allocating," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 233-235.
   • Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2014. "On the Optimality of Not Allocating," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp514, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
   See citations under working paper version above.
5. Börgers, Tilman & Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013. "When are signals complements or substitutes?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 165-195.
   • Börgers, Tilman & Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Krähmer, Daniel, 2010. "When are Signals Complements or Substitutes?," MPRA Paper 29124, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Börgers, Tilman & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Krähmer, Daniel, 2007. "When are signals complements or substitutes?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we072111, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
   • Tilman Borgers & Angel Hernanco-Veciana & Daniel Krohmer, 2010. "When are Signals Complements or Substitutes," Discussion Papers 1488, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
   See citations under working paper version above.
6. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2011. "Second best efficiency and the English auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 496-506.

   Cited by:

   1. Jan Boone & Jacob K. Goeree, 2009. "Optimal Privatisation Using Qualifying Auctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 277-297, January.
   2. Goeree, Jacob K. & Kushnir, Alexey, 2016. "Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 250-256.
   3. David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci, 2016. "Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids," Post-Print hal-01432853, HAL.
      • David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci, 2016. "Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 126(594), pages 1484-1502, August.
   4. Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2014. "On the Optimality of Not Allocating," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp514, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
      • Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2014. "On the optimality of not allocating," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 233-235.
   5. Alex Gershkov & Jacob Goeree & Alexey Kushnir & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2012. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation," Working Papers tecipa-445, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
      • Alex Gershkov & Jacob K. Goeree & Alexey Kushnir & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 197-220, January.
   6. Jacob K. Goeree & Alexey Kushnir, 2011. "A geometric approach to mechanism design," ECON - Working Papers 056, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jun 2013.
   7. Fabio Michelucci, 2022. "Promoting Entry and Efficiency via Reserve Prices," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-7, June.
   8. Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2013. "Do Not Panic: How to Avoid Inefficient Rushes Using Multi-Stage Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp489, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
   9. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Tröge, Michael, 2011. "The insider's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 339-350, March.
      • Ángel Hernando Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider'S Curse," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
      • Angel Hernando-Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider's Curse," Microeconomics 0503012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   10. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2017. "On the efficiency of the first price auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 159-161.

7. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Tröge, Michael, 2011. "The insider's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 339-350, March.
   • Ángel Hernando Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider'S Curse," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
   • Angel Hernando-Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider's Curse," Microeconomics 0503012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   See citations under working paper version above.
8. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2009. "Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 372-405, March.
   • Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2006. "Information Acquisition In Auctions: Sealed Bids Vs. Open Bids," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
   See citations under working paper version above.
9. Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2005. "Competition among auctioneers in large markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 107-127, March.

   Cited by:

   1. Gavious Arieh, 2009. "Separating Equilibria in Public Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-19, September.
   2. Cristian Troncoso-Valverde, 2013. "Competing Auctions with Heterogeneous Goods," Working Papers 46, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
   3. Diego Carrasco-Novoa & Allan Hernández-Chanto, 2022. "Competing Sellers in Security-Bid Auctions under Risk-Averse Bidders," Discussion Papers Series 655, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
   4. Jean Guillaume Forand, 2012. "Competing Through Information Provision," Working Papers 1201, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2012.
      • Forand, Jean Guillaume, 2013. "Competing through information provision," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 438-451.
      • Jean Guillaume Forand, 2007. "Competing Through Information Provision," 2007 Meeting Papers 661, Society for Economic Dynamics.
   5. Maslov, Alexander & Schwartz, Jesse A., 2022. "Imperfect competition in online auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
   6. Landi, Massimiliano & Menicucci, Domenico & Sarychev, Andrey, 2023. "Competing auctions with non-identical objects," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
   7. Damianov, Damian, 2008. "Seller Competition by Mechanism Design," MPRA Paper 9348, University Library of Munich, Germany.
      • Damian Damianov, 2012. "Seller competition by mechanism design," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(1), pages 105-137, September.
   8. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.
   9. Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, 2011. "Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1806-1841, August.
   10. Richard Dutu & Benoit Julien & Ian King, 2009. "Liquidity Constrained Competing Auctions," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1068, The University of Melbourne.
   11. Deltas, George & Jeitschko, Thomas D., 2007. "Auction hosting site pricing and market equilibrium with endogenous bidder and seller participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1190-1212, December.
   12. Ernan Haruvy & Peter Popkowski Leszczyc & Octavian Carare & James Cox & Eric Greenleaf & Wolfgang Jank & Sandy Jap & Young-Hoon Park & Michael Rothkopf, 2008. "Competition between auctions," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 431-448, December.
       • Ernan Haruvy & Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc & Octavian Carare & James C. Cox & Eric A. Greenleaf & Wolfgang Jank & Sandy Jap & Young-Hoon Park & Michael H. Rothkopf, 2008. "Competition Between Auctions," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2008-02, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
   13. Eberhard Feess & Christian Grund & Markus Walzl & Ansgar Wohlschlegel, 2014. "Competing Trade Mechanisms and Monotone Mechanism Choice," Working Papers 2014-28, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
       • Feess, Eberhard & Grund, Christian & Walzl, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2020. "Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 280(3), pages 1108-1121.

10. Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2004. "Successful uninformed bidding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 29-53, July.
    • Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2001. "Successful Uninformed Bidding," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    • Angel Hernando-Veciana, 2000. "Successful Uninformed Bidding," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0791, Econometric Society.
    See citations under working paper version above.

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 9 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (5) 2009-01-03 2011-03-05 2013-12-15 2014-08-28 2025-09-22. Author is listed
2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (4) 2006-06-17 2013-09-24 2013-12-15 2014-08-28
3. NEP-FMK: Financial Markets (2) 2006-06-17 2025-06-23
4. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2006-06-17 2009-01-03
5. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2013-09-24
6. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2011-12-13
7. NEP-MST: Market Microstructure (1) 2025-06-23
8. NEP-PAY: Payment Systems and Financial Technology (1) 2025-06-23

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