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Angel Hernando-Veciana

Personal Details

First Name:Angel
Middle Name:
Last Name:Hernando-Veciana
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:phe119
http://www.eco.uc3m.es/ahernando
Departamento de Economia Universidad Carlos III c/ Madrid, 126 28903 Getafe (Madrid) Spain
34+916249602
Terminal Degree:2000 Department of Economics; University College London (UCL) (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Departamento de Economía
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid

Madrid, Spain
http://www.eco.uc3m.es/
RePEc:edi:deuc3es (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters

Working papers

  1. A. Hernando & D. Villuendas & M. Sulc & R. Hernando & R. Seoane & A. Plastino, 2017. "Maximum Entropy Principle underlying the dynamics of automobile sales," Papers 1705.03458, arXiv.org, revised May 2017.
  2. Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2014. "On the Optimality of Not Allocating," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp514, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  3. Beker, Pablo & Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2013. "Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1017, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  4. Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2013. "Do Not Panic: How to Avoid Inefficient Rushes Using Multi-Stage Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp489, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
  5. Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2011. "Persistent markups in bidding markets with financial constraints," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1133, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  6. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2010. "Comment on: "Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences"," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1019, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  7. Ángel Hernando Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2008. "Second Best Efficiency in Auctions," Working Papers. Serie AD 2008-17, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  8. Börgers, Tilman & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Krähmer, Daniel, 2007. "When are signals complements or substitutes?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we072111, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
  9. Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2006. "Information Acquisition In Auctions: Sealed Bids Vs. Open Bids," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  10. Angel Hernando-Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider's Curse," Microeconomics 0503012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2002. "(Sub-)Optimal Entry Fees," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  12. Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2001. "Competition Among Auctioneers," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  13. Angel Hernando-Veciana, 2000. "Successful Uninformed Bidding," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0791, Econometric Society.

Articles

  1. Hagen, Martin & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2021. "Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
  2. Ángel Hernando-Veciana & Michael Tröge & Philip Strahan, 2020. "Cheap Talk and Strategic Rounding in LIBOR Submissions," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(6), pages 2585-2621.
  3. Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2018. "Inefficient rushes in auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
  4. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2017. "On the efficiency of the first price auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 159-161.
  5. Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2015. "The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 234-261.
  6. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2014. "On the optimality of not allocating," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 233-235.
  7. Börgers, Tilman & Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013. "When are signals complements or substitutes?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 165-195.
  8. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2011. "Second best efficiency and the English auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 496-506.
  9. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Tröge, Michael, 2011. "The insider's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 339-350, March.
  10. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2009. "Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 372-405, March.
  11. Ángel Hernando-Veciana, 2006. "On the Sub-optimality of Entry Fees in Auctions With Entry," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 10(1), pages 53-61, April.
  12. Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2005. "Competition among auctioneers in large markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 107-127, March.
  13. Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2004. "Successful uninformed bidding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 29-53, July.
  14. Ángel Hernando-Veciana, 1998. "Efectos del análisis crediticio sobre los incentivos empresariales," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 22(3), pages 361-392, September.

Chapters

  1. Ángel Hernando-Veciana, 2018. "Auctions," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 12, pages 318-337, Edward Elgar Publishing.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2014. "On the Optimality of Not Allocating," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp514, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.

    Cited by:

    1. Goeree, Jacob K. & Kushnir, Alexey, 2016. "Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 250-256.

  2. Beker, Pablo & Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2013. "Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1017, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.

    Cited by:

    1. Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2013. "Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints," Economic Research Papers 270532, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.

  3. Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2013. "Do Not Panic: How to Avoid Inefficient Rushes Using Multi-Stage Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp489, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.

    Cited by:

    1. Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2014. "On the Optimality of Not Allocating," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp514, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.

  4. Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2011. "Persistent markups in bidding markets with financial constraints," UC3M Working papers. Economics we1133, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

    Cited by:

    1. Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2013. "Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints," Economic Research Papers 270532, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    2. Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2015. "The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 234-261.

  5. Ángel Hernando Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2008. "Second Best Efficiency in Auctions," Working Papers. Serie AD 2008-17, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

    Cited by:

    1. Garcia-Rosa, Alfonso & Kiss, Hubert Janos & Rodriguez-Lara, Ismael, 2010. "Do Social Networks Prevent Bank Runs?," UMUFAE Economics Working Papers 9723, DIGITUM. Universidad de Murcia.
    2. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2011. "Second best efficiency and the English auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 496-506.
    3. Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2018. "Inefficient rushes in auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.
    4. Charles A. Holt & William Shobe & Dallas Burtraw & Karen Palmer & Jacob K. Goeree, 2007. "Auction Design for Selling CO2 Emission Allowances Under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative," Reports 2007-03, Center for Economic and Policy Studies.

  6. Börgers, Tilman & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Krähmer, Daniel, 2007. "When are signals complements or substitutes?," UC3M Working papers. Economics we072111, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.

    Cited by:

    1. Jean-Sauveur Ay & Julie Le Gallo, 2021. "The signaling value of nested wine names," Post-Print hal-03268014, HAL.
    2. Sahuguet, Nicolas & Chaigneau, Pierre, 2021. "The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 15625, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. James Andreoni & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2012. "Diverging Opinions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(1), pages 209-232, February.
    4. Jan Eeckhout, 2012. "Matching Information," 2012 Meeting Papers 835, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Mira Frick & Ryota Iijima & Yuhta Ishii, 2021. "Learning Efficiency of Multi-Agent Information Structures," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2299R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Dec 2021.
    6. Kaya, Ayça & Vereshchagina, Galina, 2022. "Sorting expertise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
    7. Deniz Kattwinkel & Axel Niemeyer & Justus Preusser & Alexander Winter, 2022. "Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents," Papers 2205.10910, arXiv.org.
    8. Mark Whitmeyer & Cole Williams, 2024. "Dynamic Signals," Papers 2407.16648, arXiv.org.
    9. Dirk Bergemann & Marco Ottaviani, 2021. "Information Markets and Nonmarkets," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2296, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    10. ,, 2014. "On the relationship between individual and group decisions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
    11. Roland Strausz, 2024. "Correlation‐savvy sellers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 55(2), pages 266-291, June.
    12. Caio Machado & Ana Elisa Pereira, 2023. "Optimal Capital Structure with Stock Market Feedback," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(4), pages 1329-1371.
    13. Martin Gregor, 2014. "Access fees for competing lobbies," Working Papers IES 2014/22, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Jul 2014.
    14. Ichihashi, Shota, 2021. "The economics of data externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    15. Joel Sobel, 2014. "On the relationship between individual and group decisions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000950, David K. Levine.
    16. Deniz Kattwinkel & Axel Niemeyer & Justus Preusser & Alexander Winter, 2023. "Mechanisms without transfers for fully biased agents," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2023_485, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.

  7. Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2006. "Information Acquisition In Auctions: Sealed Bids Vs. Open Bids," Working Papers. Serie AD 2006-10, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

    Cited by:

    1. Ángel Hernando Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider'S Curse," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    2. Tri Vi Dang & Florian Morath, 2013. "The Taxation of Bilateral Trade with Endogenous Information," Working Papers tax-mpg-rps-2013-07, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    3. Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch & Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2021. "Projection of Private Values in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(10), pages 3256-3298, October.
    4. Morath, Florian, 2010. "Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2010-17, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    5. Morath, Florian & Münster, Johannes, 2009. "Information acquisition in conflicts [Informationsbeschaffung in Konflikten]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2009-10, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    6. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    7. Tian, Guoqiang & Xiao, Mingjun, 2007. "Endogenous Information Acquisition on Opponents' Valuations in Multidimensional First Price Auctions," MPRA Paper 41214, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2010.
    8. Arve, Malin & Honryo, Takakazu, 2015. "Delegation and Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 524, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    9. Daniel Quint, 2010. "Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(3), pages 469-490, September.
    10. Vitali Gretschko & Alexander Rajko, 2015. "Excess information acquisition in auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(3), pages 335-355, September.

  8. Angel Hernando-Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider's Curse," Microeconomics 0503012, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Boone, J. & Goeree, J.K., 2005. "Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions," Discussion Paper 2005-72, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2009. "Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 372-405, March.
    3. Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," Working Papers halshs-00586039, HAL.
    4. Morath, Florian, 2010. "Volunteering and the strategic value of ignorance," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2010-17, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    5. Alejandro Francetich, 2013. "Becoming the Neighbor Bidder: Endogenous Winner’s Curse in Dynamic Mechanisms," Working Papers 501, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    6. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    7. Jan Boone & Roy Chen & Jacob Goeree & Angelo Polydoro, 2009. "Risky procurement with an insider bidder," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(4), pages 417-436, December.
    8. Gregory Pavlov, 2013. "Correlated Equilibria and Communication Equilibria in All-pay Auctions," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series 20132, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.

  9. Ángel Hernando Veciana, 2001. "Competition Among Auctioneers," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-18, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

    Cited by:

    1. Peters,M. & Severinov,S., 2001. "Internet auctions with many traders," Working papers 11, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.

  10. Angel Hernando-Veciana, 2000. "Successful Uninformed Bidding," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0791, Econometric Society.

    Cited by:

    1. Boone, J. & Goeree, J.K., 2005. "Optimal Privatization Using Qualifying Auctions," Discussion Paper 2005-72, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Jan Boone & Jacob K. Goeree, 2009. "Optimal Privatisation Using Qualifying Auctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 277-297, January.
    3. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2009. "Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 372-405, March.
    4. Larson, Nathan, 2009. "Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 430-460, March.
    5. Arup Daripa, 2005. "Informational Free Rides in Uniform Price Auctions: Exception or Norm?," Microeconomics 0511007, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Articles

  1. Hagen, Martin & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2021. "Multidimensional bargaining and posted prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).

    Cited by:

    1. Hagen, Martin, 2023. "Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 281-298.

  2. Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2018. "Inefficient rushes in auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(1), January.

    Cited by:

    1. Galit Ashkenazi-Golan & Yevgeny Tsodikovich & Yannick Viossat, 2021. "I Want to Tell You? Maximizing Revenue in First-Price Two-Stage Auctions," Papers 2104.09942, arXiv.org.
    2. Wang, Dazhong & Xu, Xinyi, 2022. "Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    3. Gonçalves, Ricardo & Ray, Indrajit, 2017. "Partition Equilibria in a Japanese-English Auction with Discrete Bid Levels for the Wallet Game," CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series 34, Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA.
    4. Fabio Michelucci, 2022. "Promoting Entry and Efficiency via Reserve Prices," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-7, June.
    5. Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit & Tsodikovich, Yevgeny & Viossat, Yannick, 2023. "I want to tell you? Maximizing revenue in first-price two-stage auctions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 118706, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    6. Niklas Klarnskou & Philippos Louis & Wouter Passtoors, 2024. "Feedback and Competition in Procurement e-Auctions," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 04-2024, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.

  3. Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2015. "The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 234-261.

    Cited by:

    1. Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2018. "Efficient Ascending Menu Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 18/09, Department of Economics, University of York.

  4. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2014. "On the optimality of not allocating," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(2), pages 233-235.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Börgers, Tilman & Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013. "When are signals complements or substitutes?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 165-195.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2011. "Second best efficiency and the English auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 496-506.

    Cited by:

    1. Ángel Hernando Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider'S Curse," Working Papers. Serie AD 2005-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    2. Jan Boone & Jacob K. Goeree, 2009. "Optimal Privatisation Using Qualifying Auctions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 277-297, January.
    3. Goeree, Jacob K. & Kushnir, Alexey, 2016. "Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 250-256.
    4. Alex Gershkov & Jacob K. Goeree & Alexey Kushnir & Benny Moldovanu & Xianwen Shi, 2013. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(1), pages 197-220, January.
    5. David Ettinger & Fabio Michelucci, 2016. "Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids," Post-Print hal-01432853, HAL.
    6. Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2014. "On the Optimality of Not Allocating," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp514, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    7. Jacob K. Goeree & Alexey Kushnir, 2011. "A geometric approach to mechanism design," ECON - Working Papers 056, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Jun 2013.
    8. Fabio Michelucci, 2022. "Promoting Entry and Efficiency via Reserve Prices," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(4), pages 1-7, June.
    9. Angel Hernando-Veciana & Fabio Michelucci, 2013. "Do Not Panic: How to Avoid Inefficient Rushes Using Multi-Stage Auctions," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp489, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    10. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Michelucci, Fabio, 2017. "On the efficiency of the first price auction," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 156(C), pages 159-161.

  7. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel & Tröge, Michael, 2011. "The insider's curse," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 339-350, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Hernando-Veciana, Ángel, 2009. "Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 372-405, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2005. "Competition among auctioneers in large markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 121(1), pages 107-127, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Gavious Arieh, 2009. "Separating Equilibria in Public Auctions," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 9(1), pages 1-19, September.
    2. Cristian Troncoso-Valverde, 2013. "Competing Auctions with Heterogeneous Goods," Working Papers 46, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
    3. Diego Carrasco-Novoa & Allan Hernández-Chanto, 2022. "Competing Sellers in Security-Bid Auctions under Risk-Averse Bidders," Discussion Papers Series 655, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    4. Maslov, Alexander & Schwartz, Jesse A., 2022. "Imperfect competition in online auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).
    5. Jean Guillaume Forand, 2012. "Competing Through Information Provision," Working Papers 1201, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2012.
    6. Landi, Massimiliano & Menicucci, Domenico & Sarychev, Andrey, 2023. "Competing auctions with non-identical objects," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    7. Damianov, Damian, 2008. "Seller Competition by Mechanism Design," MPRA Paper 9348, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Philippe Jehiel & Laurent Lamy, 2011. "Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000316, David K. Levine.
    9. Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, 2011. "Competition among Sellers in Securities Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(5), pages 1806-1841, August.
    10. Ernan Haruvy & Peter T. L. Popkowski Leszczyc & Octavian Carare & James C. Cox & Eric A. Greenleaf & Wolfgang Jank & Sandy Jap & Young-Hoon Park & Michael H. Rothkopf, 2008. "Competition Between Auctions," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2008-02, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
      • Ernan Haruvy & Peter Popkowski Leszczyc & Octavian Carare & James Cox & Eric Greenleaf & Wolfgang Jank & Sandy Jap & Young-Hoon Park & Michael Rothkopf, 2008. "Competition between auctions," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 431-448, December.
    11. Feess, Eberhard & Grund, Christian & Walzl, Markus & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2020. "Competing trade mechanisms and monotone mechanism choice," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 280(3), pages 1108-1121.
    12. Richard Dutu & Benoit Julien & Ian King, 2009. "Liquidity Constrained Competing Auctions," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1068, The University of Melbourne.
    13. Deltas, George & Jeitschko, Thomas D., 2007. "Auction hosting site pricing and market equilibrium with endogenous bidder and seller participation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1190-1212, December.

  10. Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2004. "Successful uninformed bidding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 29-53, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.

Chapters

    Sorry, no citations of chapters recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 7 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (4) 2009-01-03 2011-03-05 2013-12-15 2014-08-28
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (4) 2006-06-17 2013-09-24 2013-12-15 2014-08-28
  3. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (2) 2006-06-17 2009-01-03
  4. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2013-09-24
  5. NEP-FMK: Financial Markets (1) 2006-06-17
  6. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2011-12-13

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