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The Taxation of Bilateral Trade with Endogenous Information

  • Tri Vi Dang
  • Florian Morath

This paper analyzes the effects of taxation on trade in a decentralized market. We show that a tax on profits and a transaction tax have opposite implications for information acquisition and trade in the canonical take-it-and-leave-it offer bargaining model. A (marginal) increase of a transaction tax can lead to more information production and lower the probability of efficient trade. In contrast, a (marginal) increase of a profit tax can reduce the incentive to produce information and increase the probability of efficient trade. The taxation of profits can be efficiency enhancing when information is endogenous, while it has no effect when private information is exogenous.

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File URL: http://www.tax.mpg.de/RePEc/mpi/wpaper/TAX-MPG-RPS-2013-07.pdf
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Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance in its series Working Papers with number tax-mpg-rps-2013-07.

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Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mpi:wpaper:tax-mpg-rps-2013-07
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